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Abstract 
 
What factors have led to successful outcomes in international peace operations 
conducted in Sub Saharan African countries?  What factors explain mission failure?  I 
proposed a basic theory of peace operations that linked conflict conditions to mandate 
design to the capability of an intervening force deployed for mission implementation 
developed from arguments and empirical results of previous research.    
Data on 86 peace operations that occurred in 23 African states covering 33 
separate conflict periods between 1990 and 2015 was analyzed.  My main findings 
showed that mandates were derived from conflict assessments and determined the size of 
intervening force required.  The results also indicated that neither the size of an 
intervening force, nor the lead-organization, nor mandate robustness (offensive 
deterrence capacity), nor sequencing of operations were predictors of mission success or 
failure.  However, implementation forces that included parallel support operations and/or 
mission assistance from Western great powers had higher levels of successful outcomes. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The Issue 
Peace operations are designed as international interventions that seek to protect 
and enhance security within countries.  They include a variety of missions: fact-
finding/observation (peace monitoring), support of existing peace agreements (traditional 
peacekeeping), peace enforcement, and multi-dimensional peace building.  These can 
generally be categorized as either facilitative missions seeking to contain conflict or 
transformational missions seeking to resolve a conflict (Sambanis, 2008).  All peace 
operations aim to abate conflict and are legitimized through the United Nations Charter 
(Diehl & Druckman, 2015). 
The idea of international peace operations is not new.  The 1945 United Nations 
Charter provided guidelines that have been used to address threats to security: Chapter VI 
deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” Chapter VII contains provisions related 
to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression,” 
and Chapter VIII outlines the role of regional arrangements and agencies in the ensuring 
international peace and security.  However, the charter did not specifically mention peace 
observation and peacekeeping was not yet created.  Peace operations evolved through ad 
hoc responses to international crises.  Growth was slow throughout the Cold War.  
Deadlock in the Security Council limited opportunities for international intervention.  
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Peace operations began to proliferate after 1989 and in 1992 the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was formed in the UN (Autesserre, 2019). 
Since 1990, the number of peace operations and the number of participating 
country intervenors has increased dramatically.  More peace operations occurred in the 
four-year period following the end of the Cold War, 1990-1994, than in the previous fifty 
years (Williams, 2016).  However, support for peace operations declined drastically 
following the 1993 Battle for Mogadishu in Somalia.  The 1994 Rwandan Genocide 
reawakened the world to the importance of engagement, but not before the loss of nearly 
a million lives.  International support for peace operations accelerated after 2001 as great 
powers increased funding in an effort to limit global instabilities rising from intrastate 
conflict.  
Today more than 50% of United Nations peace operations take place in Africa 
(Karlsrud, 2018).  African peace operations have increased in complexity over time.  In 
the 1990s, mission mandates were mainly to observe and monitor conflict conditions in 
unstable countries.  A primary actor, the African Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), was generally not successful in efforts to make or keep peace (Williams, 2016).  
The African Union (AU) formed in 2002, emphasized the need to promote peace, 
security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of social and economic 
development.  The AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture design sought to unify 
the process for intervening in African states.  Later, most missions became 
multidimensional, seeking to focus not only to prevent bloodshed, but also on building 
positive peace.   
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Peace operation missions have grown increasingly large, costly, and complex.  
Simultaneously, they have become more successful at building lasting peace (Fortna, 
2004; 2008; Williams, 2016).  However, success has not been ubiquitous and results are 
mixed.  Some operations achieved measurable milestones while others did not.  Why 
have peace operations in Namibia, Mozambique, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the 
Comoros, and Cote d’Ivoire succeeded while those in Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and others, failed? 
Support for UN missions in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
was reduced based on limited performance achievements.  The UN High Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) convened 2014-2015 to undertake a 
thorough review of UN peace operations with the assistance of the Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs (NUPI), to resolve issues relating to the establishment of empirical 
data on peace operations’ success and support.  The outcome has been a call for 
researchers to develop a systematic data set to inform and support policy makers (de 
Coning & Drange, 2017).   
A study on the interplay between the dimensions of a conflict; the mandate 
directing the operation; and characteristics and capabilities of the intervening force 
contributes to this call for action.  Construction of peace operation forces for particular 
missions has been ad hoc and based on who is willing to serve rather than selecting the 
best and most appropriate units to perform and achieve mission objectives.  This 
construction process has resulted in a major challenge: matching intervenor capacities to 
mission requirements.  More than 80 peace operations were active in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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between 1990 and 2015.  States, regional communities, non-African organizations, the 
African Union, the United Nations, and other groups have created and supported these 
interventions.   
This thesis began with an observation that the ad hoc nature of peace operation 
construction in Africa is not random.  Operational construction has followed patterns that 
evolve over time in response to factors as disparate as the domestic politics of great 
powers, the nature of conflicts themselves, and in response to internal shifts within 
international organizations.  These operations have had disparate results.  Some 
operations such as UNTAG in Namibia have performed exceptionally well bringing 
lasting peace to conflicted societies.  Other operations such as OMIB in Burundi have 
performed their mandated tasks yet failed to produce peace.  Some have produced a 
temporary peace (UNAMIR II in Rwanda), and others have failed to establish any peace, 
withdrawing in the face of increased violence (UNOSOM II in Somalia).  Why do some 
peace operations succeed where others fail?  What factors influence the ability of a peace 
operation to address the issues endemic in a conflict?  Where are these factors found?  
Are they in the mandates that direct forces employed and attempt to address the issues 
endemic to the conflict, are they found in the capabilities of the forces that are employed 
to carry out the tasks directed by the mandate, or do both pieces impact the overall 
success or failure of a peace operation?  This thesis explores these relationships and their 





Peace operations have generated positive results.  Intervened conflicts are 
resolved at higher rates and have greater rates of peace resiliency than non-intervened 
conflicts (Fortna, 2008; Sambanis, 2008).  However, scholarship addressing the question 
“what factors impact the success or failure of a peace operation?” points to a diverse 
range of answers.  Some studies focus on intervenor composition or characteristics: who 
are the intervenors, where they come from, and how they are trained.  Bellamy and 
Williams (2013) argue that finding capable forces is a challenge to peace operations 
success; the UN can often recruit the required numbers of soldiers but as a group they 
may not have the necessary capabilities.  Jett (1999) finds that operation failure is often 
caused by poorly trained forces.  He cites instances of failure in Angola and Mozambique 
caused by soldiers who were unable to drive the equipment provided to them and shared 
no common language with the region in which they were deployed.  Daniel (2013) 
similarly finds that most UN peacekeepers come from nations in the bottom third of 
spending per soldier.  In summary, these studies find that the success of peace operations 
is effected by their struggle to meet capability needs even in the face of an adequate 
number of troops.   
Daniel (2013) and Martin-Brule (2012) examine the means to mitigate mission 
failure resulting from a lack of troop capabilities in UN “partnered missions,” that 
combine a traditional UN operation with the deployment of soldiers from a western or 
regional power to borrow advanced technical capabilities.  Martin-Brule (2012) finds that 
the involvement of political or military representatives from one of the permanent 
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members of the UN Security Council is key forces without major power support lack 
credibility and are unable to gain cooperation from belligerent parties.     
The numerical density of peacekeepers per geographic unit or per population is 
not a significant factor for success.  Fortna (2008) ruled the numbers irrelevant; finding 
instead that the mission’s very existence is key.  According to Fortna, the mission will 
either be large enough to perform the task or will serve as a trip-wire to an organization 
that can.  Sambanis (2008) comes to a similar conclusion, that the quantity of peace 
keepers has an insignificant impact on mission success.  But, the former head of UN 
Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno, argues that a mission can only succeed when 
troops are sufficient in numbers and capabilities in relation to mission needs (cited in 
Berdal, 2016).  Similarly, Badmus (2015) finds that most failures of AU and UN 
missions in Africa have been due to insufficient funding, troop numbers, and support to 
troops in the field.  Discussions on the correct “right-sizing” of mission personnel are 
ongoing.   
The role of mandate and doctrine on the success or failure of peace operations is 
not clear.  Some research finds the success of peace operations to be hamstrung by 
mandates not matched to conflict conditions.  Other argues that success is dependent on 
robust empowering mandates.  The argument that peace operations are destined to fail by 
ineffective or inappropriate mandates is focused on the selection of appropriate mandates.  
Holmqvist (2014) states that interventions designed by liberal regimes seek to produce 
clones of themselves.  Therefore, peace operations are by nature ill-conceived ventures.  
Rhoads (2016) similarly finds fault in many mandates, arguing that robust mandates 
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exceed the logical limits of peacekeeping.  Robust intervenors become an additional 
belligerent in the conflict.  This status deprives intervenors of legitimacy and stands in 
the way of success (Nascimento, 2018).  Fiedler (2000) concludes the consent of the 
parties is the most important element.  He argues, more robust mandates are inappropriate 
as they violate the principle of consent.     
Unclear or vague mandates may condemn peace operations to failure. de Coning, 
Aoi, and Karlsrud (2017) find that the UN is hamstrung by a lack of coherent vision and 
concrete direction in peace operations.  Williams (2016) argues that intervening forces 
are often given vague orders, but also contradictory guidance.  Missions deployed in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan instructed peacekeepers to 
simultaneously help governments extend their authority and protect civilians with the full 
knowledge that the governments were among the greatest perpetrators of violence against 
civilians.   
 Some scholars hold the key to success lies in more robust multidimensional or 
peace enforcement mandates that emanate from chapter VII of the UN Charter and do not 
require host nation consent (United Nations, 2018).  Sandler’s (2017) research supports 
the conclusion that multidimensional missions have achieved a higher success rate due to 
their focus on issues foundational to the conflict.  Sambanis’ (2008) findings indicate a 
robust mandate is the key to success.  Similarly, Thakur’s (2014) reading of the Brahimi 
Report finds that credible force is the keystone.  The over emphasis of neutrality in 
mandates has led to timidity in the face of human rights violations (Hultman, 2014).  
Therefore, timidity of troops in the field is an effect of poor mandates.  This is echoed by 
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NATO doctrine that states that intervenors can experience feelings of impotence due to 
limited rules of engagement.  The findings of this group argue that robust mandates and 
rules of engagement lead to credible peace interventions.   
Other findings hold that conflict specific factors have the greatest effect on peace 
mission success or failure, where an understanding of the conflict environment is key to 
overall mission achievement.  According to Dennys (2014) conflict dynamics can only be 
understood by local actors.  Therefore, outside interventions are more likely to have 
negative than positive outcomes.  Mobekk (2017) argues that the failure of multiple 
missions to Haiti was caused by a weak comprehension of local political factors.  
Essentially because local actors caused the conflict, they are responsible for conflict 
resolution.  Whalan (2013) finds the intervenor’s ability to obtain local compliance and 
cooperation as the key.  Mission efficacy requires peacekeepers must have power to 
influence local actors and local actors must respect the legitimacy of peacekeepers for the 
mission.  Peace operations fail when intervenors attempt to impose a standard response 
template onto a conflict.  Howard (2007) also focuses on the interplay between intervenor 
and conflict parties, noting that mission success depends on the extent that the 
peacekeepers learn from local actors: rigid implementation of missions from above 
causes certain failure while integrating lessons and direction from below leads to success.      
Fortna (2008) and Karlsrud (2018) argue that the success or failure of a peace 
operation is determined by the match of the mission to the conflict’s political economy.  
Fortna’s recommendations use conflict ripeness theory to move the belligerents towards 
peace (Zartman, 2003).  She argues that peace is best achieved by increasing the cost of 
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violence and financially incentivizing peace.  Karlsrud (2018) argues that failures are 
caused by the international community’s preference to work with states over rebel 
groups.  Communities in conflict may receive more services and support from rebel 
groups than from their own legitimate government.  Therefore, to shift the power balance 
toward the government is to ignore the political economy that drives the conflict.  
Similarly, Westendorf (2015) finds that intervenors view peace as a technical problem 
and so overlook the underlying political and economic factors that have created the 
conflict.  The focus becomes the views and interests of the elite that inadvertently causes 
the extension and entrenchment of the conflict (Tardy, 2017).  These authors all agree 
that getting the local dynamics right is more likely to result in a successful peace 
operation mission.  
Other scholars point to the primacy of regional factors in determining the success 
or failure of a peace operation.  Regional states can serve as spoilers by allowing arms 
shipments into a conflict zone or facilitating a profitable illicit flow of raw materials out 
of the conflict zone (Jett, 1999).  van der Lijn’s (2010) study states that the failure is 
inevitable without the cooperation of regional actors.  UN, NATO, and other institutional 
doctrine all emphasizes the importance of positive involvement of regional actors as 
intervenors (Garb, 2014).   
Most studies agree on the utility of peace operations (Dorussen, 2014).  
Researchers find answers to the success or failure of a peace operation in analysis of the 
conflict environment, the operation’s mandate, or intervenor composition and capacity.  
Surprisingly, intervening force troop numeric strength has been found to be irrelevant to 
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predicting mission success (Fortna, 2008).  Additionally, there is no clear understanding 
of the interplay between the dimensions of a conflict; the mandate directing the purpose 
and objectives of a peace operation mission; and the characteristics of capability defining 
and constituting the intervening force.  The disparity of findings has failed to produce 
usable data to policy makers in several key areas (de Coning & Drange, 2017).  The 
proposed study is designed to address some of these issues. 
The Argument 
What is the relationship between the characteristics of a conflict, the peace 
operation mandate designed to reduce violence, and the intervenor characteristics in 
determining the outcome of such international engagements?  This question is examined 
by analyzing post-Cold War peace operations (1990-2015) in Sub-Saharan African 
countries1.  My argument is that mandates are developed in direct response to the conflict 
environment and will be successful when carried out by a capable intervening force.  
Peace operations will have higher rates of success when mandates are properly 
constructed and staffed by sufficiently trained and equipped forces.  The basic theory of 
peace operations is diagrammed in Figure 1. 
                                                 
1 This study utilizes the United Kingdom Government’s parameters for defining the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region.  This definition includes all independent countries on the African continent excepting the northern 
states of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Also included are the island states of Madagascar, 




My hypotheses are crafted to challenge the assumptions of this model.  I assume 
that the nature of a conflict dictates the mandate that determines the required force 
capabilities.  The chain leading to failure can therefore be the result of a mandate that 
does not address the conflict issues or a force capacity that cannot fulfill the mandate’s 
requirements.  It follows that mission success requires the appropriate match of 
intervenor capabilities to mandate requirements to conflict situation.  Nine hypotheses 
will be tested to evaluate different elements of this chain.   
This study will analyze both the ability of the intervention force to accomplish its 
mandated tasks, this mission’s overall effects on the conflict, and its relation to other 
peace operations.  The key questions are: did the intervention force produce peace, did it 
transition from or to another operation, and what was the overall success of the peace 































within five years?).  Cases with similar outcomes will be analyzed to identify common 
points of failure or success and focus on how the intervening forces played a role in peace 
operation outcomes. 
Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is composed of five chapters.  The introduction first chapter provides a 
review of peace operation literature and presents the basis argument about peace 
operation success.  The second chapter examines the history and evolution of conflicts 
and peace operations in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Chapter two provides an overview of all 
post-World War II wars and all post-Cold War interventions into Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Conflict trends, international organization actions, mission trends, and great power 
actions are all discussed.  Different models of operational change and support are 
examined in detail.  Collectively, the first two chapters establish the background 
information that informed the design of my analysis.   
Chapter three discusses the research design.  The chapter details my conflict-
mandate-intervenor conceptual model of peace operations.  Next, data collection, variable 
selection, analysis method, are all explained.  The chapter explains the manner that 
qualitative analysis will test hypotheses linking mandate selection to conflict 
characteristics and intervenor characteristics to mandate type.        
Chapter four and five are devoted to empirical findings and conclusions draw 
from these findings.  Chapter four tests links between conflict, mandate, and intervenor in 
the search for patterns that produce greater incidences of resilient peace.  The chapter 
explains the raw outputs and highlights those variables found to be significant.  Chapter 
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five summarizes my findings and analyzes how this research aligns with other 









CHAPTER TWO: AFRICAN CONFLICTS AND PEACE OPERATIONS: A 
DESCRIPTION 
Conflict in Individual States 
Post-World War II conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have been dominated by the 
question for independence followed by the struggle to maintain sovereignty once gained.  
Sub-Saharan Africa in 1950 had only three independent states; Ethiopia, Liberia, and 
South Africa.  Ghana and Guinea increased the total to five by the end of the 1950s.  The 
1960s and 70s saw a dramatic uptick in independence as France and other European 
powers moved away from colonization.  Djibouti was the last country to gain 
independence from a European power; gaining its independence from France in 1977.  
Other Sub-Saharan nations have gained their independence from other African powers; 
Namibia became independent from South Africa in 1990; Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993; 
and most recently South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 (DFID, 2006).   
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to provide an overview of violence 
and wars within sub-Saharan African countries in order to highlight the magnitude of 
conflict in this region; and second, to describe specific international peace operations in 
Africa that were organized to reduce conflict intensity and/or resolve conflict.   
Self-determination conflicts have been ubiquitous in the post-World War II 
history of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Eight of the 43 nations in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
engaged in self-determination conflicts at the time of independence, another 11 erupted 
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into conflict in the immediate aftermath of independence, and a further 9 experienced 
similar conflicts after the initial post-independence phase.  Therefore, in total 28 of 43 
nations in question experienced self-determination conflicts according to Department for 
International Development (DFID).  These conflicts took place before, during, and after 
independence.  The belligerents have struggled for independence from colonial powers 
and from governments that they felt did not represent their group or interests.  The 
Correlates of War (COW) data defines “war” by the standard of 1,000 deaths per annum.  
By their criteria, the record shows that 70 wars have occurred in 27 Sub-Saharan African 
states between 1945 and 2015.  A brief outline of conflicts (and fatalities) in these 
countries is presented drawing on data and narratives from the COW collection (Sarkees 
& Wayman, 2010). Descriptions of peace operations follow.  
Angola 
Conflicts.  Several separate periods of violent conflict occurred in Angola.  First, 
the war of independence (1961-1974) that concluded with an end to 400 years of 
Portuguese colonial rule.  There were 25,000 Angolan and 4,000 Portuguese battle-
related deaths.  Second, The Angola Guerrilla War (1974-75) between three groups, the 
Marxist Popular Movement for the Rebellion of Angola (MPLA), the National front for 
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA).  No reliable estimates for battle deaths exist for this conflict (Sarkees & 
Wayman, 2010).  Third, the War Over Angola (1975-76) involving South African troops 
(supporting UNITA) and Cuban troops (supporting MPLA) that resulted in 2,700 battle 
deaths.  Fourth, the Angolan Control War (1976-1991) between UNITA, FMLA, and 
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MPLA, that led to approximately 150,000 casualties.  Fifth, the Angolan War of the 
Cities (1992-1994) caused an estimated 500,000 total deaths (Mullenbach, 2018).  
Finally, another war with 25,000 battle-related deaths occurred between 1998-2002 
ending with MPLA government victory and a peace agreement that has been sustained. 
Peace Operations.  Four peace operations took place in Angola during the 
Angolan Control War, 1976-1991, and the Angolan War of the Cities, 1992-1994.  The 
UN led all four operations.  The 70-person United Nations Angola Verification Mission I 
(UNAVEM I) was a peace monitoring operation beginning in January of 1989 and 
ending in June of 1991.  UNAVEM I was tasked with observing the withdrawal of Cuban 
forces from Angola.  The mission transitioned to the 718-person peacekeeping 
UNAVEM II mission following the signing of a cease-fire.  UNAVEM II operated from 
June of 1991 to February of 1995.  The operation was tasked with ceasefire observance, 
police development, and election observation.  UNAVEM II transitioned to the 4,220-
person peacekeeping operation UNAVEM III in response to the February 1995 signing of 
the Lusaka protocol peace agreement.  UNAVEM III monitored the military mobilization 
and observed the transition of UNITA from an armed movement into a political party.  
UNAVEM III then transitioned to the 2,773 peacekeeping UN Observer Mission in 
Angola (MONUA) in June of 1997.  MONUA was disbanded in March 1999 in response 
to conflict resurgence.  Eventual peace in Angola was unrelated to the efforts of any of 




 Conflicts.  Three wars developed between the two dominant ethnic groups: Tutsis 
and Hutus in their quest for governmental control.  The first conflict in 1972 lasted a few 
weeks and resulted in 2,000 battle related deaths.  The second, (1993-1998) led to 50,000 
civilian deaths, plus an unknown number of direct combatant casualties.  The third war 
(2001-2003) left an estimated 300,000 people dead. 
Peace Operations.  Burundi played host to five peace operations covering the 
Second, 1991-1998, and Third, 2001-2003, Burundi Wars.  The 47 personnel OAU 
Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) monitored the Second Burundi War from 
December 1993 to July 1996.  The mission withdrew in 1996 due to the financial burden 
of mission support.  The Second Burundi War continued for nearly three years after 
OMIB’s withdrawal (Pan African News Agency, 1997). 
Three peace operations supported the peace process of the Third Burundi War.  
The 750-person peace enforcement South African Protection Service Detachment 
(SAPSD) supported the peace process by ensuring the security of Burundi leaders from 
October 2001 to August 2009.  SAPSD began as a standalone mission, transitioned to a 
support mission to the peacekeeping African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and returned to 
a standalone mission.  The AU led 3,029-person AMIB was installed in support of a 
cease fire and tasked with preventing a resurgence of violence.  AMIB conducted 
operations February 2003 to June 2004 before transitioning to the 6,352-person 
peacebuilding UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) following the peace agreement signing.  
ONUB provided security, assisted with disarmament, ensured election security, and 
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developed institutions from June 2004 to December 2006.  SAPSD continued its duties 
following ONUB’s withdrawal.  It finally withdrew in August 2009 after ensuring 
continuing security for elected leaders through Burundi’s post-war transition period 
(Nantulya, 2016 ).  Burundi’s peace remained resilient after the departure of all peace 
operations.   
Central African Republic 
Conflicts.  The Central African Republic has been plagued by conflicts and 
struggles for control be they religious, ethnic, or otherwise since its independence from 
France in 1960.  These conflicts resulted in incalculable deaths and several non-
democratic changes of power.  The Central African Republic War (2012 to 2013) is the 
only episode in which this violence reached the level of war.  Multiple Muslim majority 
rebel groups combined to form the Séléka Coalition.  They were opposed by Christian 
majority Anti-Balaka forces.  The conflict resulted in the collapse of multiple 
governments and more than 6,300 battle related deaths (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 
2018).  The conflict continues to the present at a less than war level (Mullenbach, 2018).      
Peace Operations.  The Central African Republic has hosted three separate series 
of peace operations.  The first in a time of less than warfare violence, the second failed to 
prevent the onset of war, and the third series was deployed to allay violence of the 
Central African Republic War.   
The first period of intervention began in February 1997 and extended until 
February 2000.  The 800-person Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic 
(MISAB) conducted operations from February 1997 to April 1998.  MISAB was a peace 
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enforcement operation to stabilize the Central African Republic that was composed of an 
adhoc coalition of African nations.  The UN led UN Mission in the Central African 
Republic (MINURCA) replaced MISAB in April 1998.  MINURCA was a 1,612-person 
peace building mission designed to enhance Central African institutions and see the 
country through a democratic election process.  MINURCA mission stood down in 
February of 2000 (United Nations, 2001).  Peace lasted for one-year after the conclusion 
of the MINURCA operation (Mullenbach, 2018). 
The second period of intervention extended from February 2002 to December 
2013 and encapsulated three separate peace enforcement operations.  Each operation was 
led by an African regional entity and was tasked with a nearly identical mission; support 
and defend the recognized government against rival militant groups.  The first operation 
was deployed by the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD).  The CEN-SAD 
mission deployed 300 troops from February until December 2002.   CEN-SAD was 
augmented by the 380-troop Multinational Force in the Central African Republic 
(FOMUC) in October 2002.  FOMUC was a CEMAC peace enforcement operation that 
remained in place until transition to the larger ECCAS led Mission for the Consolidation 
of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) in June 2008.  MICOPAX was a 
2,800-person force that remained in place until December 2013.  MICOPAX failed to 
stop the Séléka led fall of Bangui in 2011.  The second period of intervention failed to 
prevent the onset of the Central African War as well as the subsequent defeat of the 
recognized government (Meyer, 2009).  
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The Central African Republic War ignited a global focus on the Central African 
Republic resulting in the deployment of four peace operations led by four different 
entities.  French Operation Sangaris and the AU’s African-led International Support 
Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) were launched in December 2013.  
MISCA’s 6,030 personnel were tasked as a peacekeeping force responsible for stabilizing 
the country and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.  The 1,600 French soldiers 
of Operation Sangaris were tasked with peace enforcement in support of MISCA.  
MISCA was unable to neither stop the violence nor effect the underlying conditions.  As 
a result, it transitioned to UN Multidimensional Integrated Stability Mission in the 
Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in September 2014 (United Nations, 2018).  
MINUSCA was an 14,110-person UN led peacebuilding operation tasked with stabilizing 
and supporting the transition of the republic to democracy.  The EU Military Operation in 
the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) was opened as a peacekeeping operation 
supporting MINUSCA via providing local security in Bangui.  EUFOR RCA’s 700 
troops fulfilled this mission from September 2014 until March 2015 (European Union, 
2018).  Operation Sangaris was withdrawn in October 2016.  The conflict continues at the 
less than war level and MINUSCA continues to support stability and the transition to 
democracy.      
Comoros 
Conflicts.  The Comoros islands have experienced frequent low-level conflicts for 
central control.  Both non-democratic transitions of power and election related violence 
have perpetuated instability.  These incidents have all arisen from inter-island rivalry and 
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power competition.  None of these events have risen to the level of war (Mullenbach, 
2018).  
Peace Operations.  Comoros has hosted seven peace operations despite never 
reaching conflict at the level of war.  Five of the seven operations were monitoring 
operations deployed during times of election or disarmament.  All seven have been led by 
either the AU or its precursor organization, the OAU.  The four Observer Mission in the 
Comoros (OMIC, OMIC 2, OMIC 3, and OMIC 4) missions and AMISEC were 
monitoring missions that occurred in isolation from one another.  OMIC consisted of 20 
observers, took place from November 1997 to May 1999, and was tasked with building 
confidence in the government of Comoros by way of observing actions.  OMIC 2 had 14 
observers, took place from November 2001 to February 2002, and was responsible for 
observing combatant disarmament.  OMIC 3 had 34 observers, took place from March to 
May 2002, and was responsible for observing election related violence.  OMIC 4 had 39 
observers, took place from November 2001 to February 2002, and was responsible for 
observing election related violence.  The March to June 2006 AU Mission to Support 
Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) had an observer mandate for its 522-personnel to 
carry out.  The Electoral and Security Mission in the Comoros (MAES) and Operation 
Democracy in the Comoros were the only partnered missions in the Comoros.  MAES’s 
482 personnel conducted peacekeeping operations from June 2007 to October 2008.  
Operation Democracy in the Comoros’1,350 personnel executed a peace enforcement 
mandate in support of MAES from March 2008 to April 2008.  The conclusion of MAES 
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mission has led to a resilient peace with no further peace operation deployments and no 
incidents of war (Mullenbach, 2018). 
Chad 
Conflicts.  Chad has experienced six conflicts reaching the level of war.  These 
conflicts have nearly all been wars for central control.  Belligerent groups have been 
frequently supported by and served as proxies of France, Libya, and Sudan.  The First 
Chadian Rebellion (1966-1971) was fought by the National Liberation Front of Chad 
(FROLINAT) against French supported government of Chad.  Combat deaths are 
estimated four-thousand in total (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  The Second Chadian War 
(1980-1984) was fought between the Chadian government, Sudanese/French supported 
Armed Forces of the North (FAN), and Libyan supported FROLINAT.  The war 
produced six-thousand battle related deaths and ended with the FAN consolidation of 
power.  Next, the Azouzou Strip War (1986-1987) resulted from Libya’s refusal to 
withdraw from and attempted annexation of northern Chad following the Second Chadian 
War.  Chad won a decisive victory.  Battle related deaths are estimated at 7,000 Libyans 
and 1,000 Chadians (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Then, the Déby Coup (1989-1990) 
pitted a rebel group led by Iriss Déby and supported by both Sudan and Libya against the 
Chadian government.  The war ended with Déby in power and an estimated 4,000 battle 
related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Next, the Togoimi Revolt (1998-2000) was 
fought between the government of Chad and a coalition of northern rebel groups.  The 
war ended with a negotiated settlement and resulted in 1,500 battle related deaths 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Finally, the Chad-United Opposition War (2005-2008) 
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pitted the government of Chad against a Sudanese supported alliance of rebel groups 
from eastern Chad and Darfur.  The war ended in a negotiated settlement and caused 
3,500 battle related deaths.  
Peace Operations.  Chad has hosted one stand-alone and one series of two peace 
operations dispersed between two conflicts.  The UN led monitoring operation, UN 
Azouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG), monitored the Libyan withdrawal from 
Azouzou Strip between May and June 1994 (United Nations, 2018).  The mission was 
limited to 15 personnel.  Peace lasted four years ending with the outbreak of the Fourth 
Chad War (Togoimi Revolt) of 1998-2000. 
The second group of operations deployed in response to the Chad-United 
Opposition War of 2005-2008.  The UN led international intervention with the 
peacebuilding UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) 
from September 2007 to December 2010.  MINURCAT consisted of 4,903 personnel 
tasked with supporting the rule of law and protection of civilians (United Nations, 2018).  
MINURCAT was supported from January 2008 to March 2009 by the EU Military 
Operation in Chad (EUFOR-Chad).  The EUFOR-Chad peacekeeping operation consisted 
of 3,700-personnel tasked with securing the areas around and within refugee camps 
(European Union, 2018 ).  MINURCAT/EUFOR-Chad produced a resilient peace in 
Chad’s eastern border regions.  
Côte d’Ivoire 
Conflicts.  Côte d’Ivoire experienced two wars post-independence.  Both conflicts 
were caused by intergroup tensions between southern Christian and northern Muslim 
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groups.  The Côte d’Ivoire Military War (2002-2005) pitted various military units against 
one another.  The conflict ended in a negotiated settlement and caused around 3,000 total 
battle related deaths occurred (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  The Second Côte d’Ivoire 
War (2011) stemmed from similar circumstances and caused an additional 3,000 battle 
related deaths.       
Peace Operations.  Côte d’Ivoire hosted four peace operations in one series 
confronting two wars and stretching from 2002 to 2017.  The Côte d’Ivoire Military 
War’s beginning was met with the quick deployment of the 5,000-soldier French 
Operation Licorne.  Operation Licorne initially deployed as a peacekeeping operation, 
but occasionally adopted the offensive nature of peace enforcement (French Ministry of 
Defense, 2018).  The 1,500-person peacekeeping Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) operation deployed in October 
2002 to enforce a ceasefire.  The UN deployed the 184-person UN Mission in Côte 
d’Ivoire (MINUCI) monitor mission in May 2003 to observe the conflict and assist 
ECOMICI.  In April 2004, both ECOMICI and MINUCI transitioned into the 6,910-
person UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) peacebuilding mission.  Peace held in 
Côte d’Ivoire from 2005 to 2011 (United Nations, 2018).     
ONUCI and Operation Licorne remained in place to support Ivoirian peace, but 
failed to hold off the Second Côte d’Ivoire War that resulted from president Gbagbo’s 
2011 stolen election.  However, their presence did limit the war’s duration to less than 
one year.  The two missions held in place after the war with Operation Licorne 
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withdrawing in 2015 and ONUCI in 2017 (United Nations, 2018).  Peace has been 
resilient since the withdrawal of ONUCI.   
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)  
Conflicts.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Zaire has 
experienced nearly endemic conflict since independence from Belgium in 1960.  The 
country has hosted six wars and innumerable incidents of organized violence at the less 
than war level.  The First DRC (Zaire) War (1960–1963) took place in southeastern 
province of Katanga between the Zairian government supported by the United Nations 
Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and local rebels.  The war ended in government victory 
and 9,000 battle related deaths.  The Jeunesse War (1963 to 1965) was a second war of 
succession.   A Maoist group calling itself the Jeunesse warriors battled the government 
for an independent Kwilu province.  The war ended in a government victory and resulted 
in 9,000 battle related deaths.  The Simba Rebellion or Third DRC War overlapped in 
time with the Jeunesse War between 1964 and 1965.  The Simbas supported by the 
Cuban, Algerian, and Egyptian Governments fought government forces aided by the 
Belgian military and the United States Air Force.  The war ended in a government victory 
and caused over 4,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Next came a 
resumption of the First DRC War.  The Shaba War or Fourth DRC War (1978) resulted 
in approximately 1,000 battle related deaths; nearly all on the separatist’s side.  The Fifth 
DRC War (1996 to 1997) resulted in the overthrow of the Mobuto regime by the Alliance 
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) aided by Rwanda and 
Uganda.  The war resulted in at least 4,000 battle-related deaths and returned the name of 
 
 26 
the country to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  
Lastly, Africa’s World War (1998-2002) began as a struggle between the government and 
multiple rebel groups.  Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi supported the rebel groups.  
Zimbabwe, Chad, Sudan, Angola, and Namibia supported the government.  The war 
ended in a negotiated power sharing agreement and caused an incalculable number of 
deaths; estimates range from one million to 7.6 million (Associated Press, 2010).  Post 
conflict violence has been endemic in the DRC but has not reached the status of a further 
intra-state war (Mullenbach, 2018).     
Peace Operations.  The international reaction to Africa’s World War in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the most complex and robust series of peace 
operation interventions.  The series began with the 43-person OAU Observer Mission 
that was sent to monitor an early cease fire from November 1999 to November 2000.  
The 4,278-person UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo-a 
(MONUC-a) peacekeeping mission was initiated 14 days after the OAU Observer 
Mission.  MONUC-a served to separate combatants and to protect civilians.  MONUC-a 
transitioned to the massive 22,016-person MONUC-b peacebuilding mission in January 
2002.  MONUC-b added disarmament, reintegration, rule of law development, and 
border protection to the mandate.  MONUC-b was assisted by the 2,060-soldier 
Operation Artemis EU peace enforcement mission from June to September 2003.  The 
EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC-Congo) fifty personnel peacebuilding 
operation also supported MONUC-b with security sector reform from January 2005 until 
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the present.  MONUC-b was also supported by the 2,275-person peacebuilding EU Force 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EURFOR-RD) that performed election support 
from April to September 2006.  MONUC-b transitioned to the 20,359 UN Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) 
peacebuilding mission.  MONUSCO added robust peace enforcement tasks and 
capabilities to the mission.  MONUSCO continues to the present supported by EUSEC-
Congo.   
Eritrea and Ethiopia 
Conflicts.  Eritrea’s battle for independence encompassed four wars.  The first 
war, the Eritrean Split (1972-1974) was fought between the Eritrean Liberation Front 
(ELF) and a splinter group named the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (ELPF).  The 
infighting ended as the groups turned their efforts against Ethiopia.  The war resulted in 
3,000 combat deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Next, Ethiopian troops supported by 
Cuba defeated the ELF and ELPF in the Eritrean War (1975-1978).  The war resulted in 
over 12,000 battle-related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Then, the Tigrean and 
Eritrean War (1982-1991) resulted in Eritrean and Tigrean rebel victory over the 
Ethiopian government.  The Tigrean rebels became the national government of Ethiopia 
and the EPLF announced Eritrean independence.  The war caused 75,000 battle-related 
deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Finally, the Badme Border War (1988-2000) 
emanated from an unresolved border dispute.  The war ended in an OAU mediated 




Peace Operations.  The UN and AU deployed peacekeeping forces in response to 
the inter-state Badme Border War.  Both the AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea 
(OMLEE) and UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) deployed from July 2000 
to July 2008.  UNMEE was a 4,627-person peacekeeping force that deployed to separate 
the waring parties in support of a cease fire agreement (United Nations, 2018).  OMLEE 
was a 43-person monitoring mission deployed to monitor the conflict and provide AU 
assistance to the UN (Williams, 2016).  Peace was resilient following the withdrawal of 
forces.    
Guinea 
Conflicts.  The Guinean War (2000-2001) emanated from a failed coup and the 
spillover of regional instability.  Government forces battled the Rally of Democratic 
Forces of Guinea in country and crossed boarders to fight Liberian national forces.  The 
war ended in a peace agreement and resulted in slightly more than 1,000 combat deaths.  
Peace Operations.  The ECOWAS brokered peace agreement did include plans 
for the deployment of a peace keeping force, but funding was never secured and the 
deployment of ECOMOG (ECOWAS Military Observation Group) Guinea never 
occurred (Mullenbach, 2018). 
Guinea Bissau 
Conflicts.  The Guinea-Bissau Military War (1998-1999) was an intra-state war 
played out between the government backed by Senegal and Guinea and rebel forces.  The 
war ended with a rebel victory and resulted in over 2,000 combat related deaths.  
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Residual violence was quelled by the ECOWAS peacekeeping force, ECOWAS Military 
Observer Group (ECOMOG-GB) peace operation. 
Peace Operations.  Guinea-Bissau has seen one peace operation deployed in 
response to the Guinea-Bissau Military War (1998-1999) and three deployed during 
times of less than war conflict.  ECOMOG-GB deployed from December 1998 to June 
1999 in response to the Guinea-Bissau Military War.  ECOMOG-GB was a 712-person 
peacekeeping force sent to ensure the success of the peace agreement (Obi, 2009).  
ECOMOG-GB produced a resilient peace with no periods of war and no further peace 
operation deployments for nine years.  The 24-person peacebuilding EU Security Sector 
Reform (EU-SSR) mission deployed February 2008 to enhance the rule of law via 
security sector reform.  The mission withdrew in September 2010 in response to host 
government non-adherence to the rule of law (European Union, 2018).  The 250-person 
Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG-GB) peacebuilding mission 
deployed from March 2011 to June of 2012 with a similar mandate to that of the EU-
SSR.  MISSANG-GB withdrew after a coup destabilized Guinea-Bissau (Mullenbach, 
2018).  The 700-person peacekeeping ECOMIB Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) 
operation deployed in May 2012 to provide security through a peace agreement mandated 
transition period.  ECOMIB would remain in place until June 2017.  Peace has been 
resilient since the mission closure.  
Kenya 
Conflicts.  Post-World War II Kenya experienced one conflict rising to the level 
of war.  The extra-state British-Mau Mau War (1952-1956) contested between the “Mau 
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Mau” guerilla force and the British military.  The war resulted in more than 17,000 battle 
related deaths and ended in a British military victory.          
Peace Operations.  Kenya has not hosted any peace operations.   
Liberia 
Conflicts.  Charles Taylor subjected Liberia to a near perpetual state of conflict 
between 1989 and 2003 reaching the level of war three times.  The First Liberia War 
(1989-1990) began when National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), supported by 
Libya’s Qaddafi and incubated in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, invaded.  ECOWAS 
deployed the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) as a peace-enforcement 
mission to fight the NPFL on behalf of the national government.  The conflict ended in a 
stalemate and caused 10,000 battle field deaths.  War resumed with the Second Liberia 
War (1992-1996).  The war ended in national elections and an estimated 200,000 to 
300,000 deaths.  Finally, the Liberia-LURD War (2002-2003) broke between the Taylor 
led government and two Guinean supported rebel groups.  The Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
(MODEL) rebel groups won the war.  The signing of a peace treaty, the imprisonment of 
Charles Taylor, and the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the first African female head 
of state followed the war.  An accurate death toll is unknown for this war.   
Peace Operations.  Liberia has hosted six peace operations in two series spanning 
three wars between 1990 and the 2018.  The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG-L) 
12,040-person peace enforcement mission was deployed to support the government in 
ending the First Liberian war in August 1990 and would stay through the Second 
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Liberian War.  The UN deployed a 642-person monitoring mission, UN Observer 
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), to observe ceasefire adherence and support ECOMOG-L 
from September 1993 to September 1997.  ECOMOG-L officially ended in February 
1998, but in practice remained in place continuing its mission until October 1999 (Obi, 
2009).   Peace was resilient for four years after the withdrawal of ECOMOG-L forces. 
The second series of international peace operations in Liberia were launched to 
combat the Liberia – LURD War.  ECOWAS deployed the 3,356-person ECOWAS 
Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) peacekeeping mission from August to September 2003.  
ECOMIL was supported by the 4,350-person US Joint Task Force (JTF) Liberia peace 
enforcement mission from August to September 2003.  ECOMIL transitioned 
responsibilities to the newly established UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in October of 
2003 (Mullenbach, 2018).  The UNMIL peacebuilding mission remained in place until 
March 2018.  It was comprised of 17,045-personnel and focused on maintaining the 
peace while developing the host nation security sector (United Nations, 2018).  Peace has 
been resilient post UNMIL.  
Madagascar 
Conflicts.  The Third Franco-Madagascan War was fought 1947-1948.  Malagasy 
soldiers returning from WWII service in the French army fought the French military for 
control of the island.  The French army brutally repressed the uprising.  The war resulted 
in a French victory and 100,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).    




Conflicts.  Mali’s Tuareg Independence War (2012-2013) was sparked by the 
return of Tuareg fighters who had been employed by Libyan president Gadhafi prior to 
his fall.  The war was fought between Tuareg fighters in the National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) supported by numerous militant Islamic groups and the 
Malian government supported by France, Chad, and Nigeria.  The war officially ended in 
a government victory and resulted in over 1,000 combat deaths.  However, violence 
continues at a less than war level.    
Peace Operations.  Mali’s Tuareg Independence War has sparked a large 
international peace operation response.  The first deployment was the 3,300-troop joint 
ECOWAS-AU African Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) peace 
enforcement operation deployed from December 2012 to April 2013.  France deployed 
Operation Serval in January 2013 and remained in place until July 2014.  Operation 
Serval was a 4,000-soldier peace enforcement operation in support of AFISMA and the 
UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).  AFISMA and Serval 
together sought to restore Malian government control of the north and prevent the spread 
of terrorist activities.  AFISMA transitioned to MINUSMA in April 2013.  MINUSMA is 
a 15,425-person peace building mission that seeks to stabilize the region and develop 
Malian institutions.  MINUSMA is also supported by the EU Training Mission in Mali 
(EUTM Mali) that has performed security sector reform and development peacebuilding 
efforts since February 2013.  Operation Serval was replaced by Operation Barkhane in 
August 2014.  Operation Barkhane has an expended mission to provide enforcement 
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capabilities against terror groups throughout the Sahel.  Peace has not been established in 
Mali (World Peace Foundation, 2017). 
Mozambique 
Conflicts.  Conflicts in Mozambique twice reached the level of war.  The 
Mozambique-Portuguese War (1964-1975) was fought between the Marxist Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) backed by the Soviet Union and China and the 
Portuguese government.  The war ended when a Portuguese coup resulted in the 
withdrawal of all troops.  The war resulted in Mozambican independence and 14,000 
battle related deaths.  The Mozambique War (1979-1992) soon followed.  The 
Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) supported by South Africa fought 
FRELIMO supported by Zimbabwe and Tanzania for central control.  The war ended in a 
political settlement and caused over 20,000 battle related deaths. 
Peace Operations.  The Mozambique War saw a small peacekeeping mission 
transfer to a larger peacebuilding operation and the production of resilient peace.  The 30-
person Joint Verification Mission (JVC) was deployed from December 1990 to October 
1992.  The JVC maintained safe passage corridors, supported the cease-fire, and enabled 
time for the Rome Agreement to be negotiated.  The JVC was an adhoc organization with 
Kenya, Portugal, US, Zambia, Congo, France, USSR, and UK all contributing troops 
(Hume, 1994).  The JVC was replaced by the 6,576-pax UN Operation in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ) in December 1992.  ONUMOZ was tasked with implementing the Rome 
Agreement including election and governance support.  ONUMOZ was closed in 




Conflicts.  Namibia has experienced one war.  The South African Border War 
(1975-1988) was fought by the South West Africans Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO) 
supported by Angola against the South African government.  The war ended in a peace 
agreement and Namibian independence.  The war resulted in 20,000 battle related deaths 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).   
Peace Operations.  The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was the only 
peace operation to support the peace process of the South African Border War.  
UNTAG’s 7,993 personnel oversaw elections and assisted in ending systematic 
discrimination.  The UNTAG peacebuilding operation deployed from April 1989 to 
March 1990 and produced a resilient peace (United Nations, 2001). 
Nigeria 
Conflicts.  Post-Independence Nigeria has been plagued by inter-ethnic conflict 
that has risen to the level of war on four occasions.  The Biafra War (1967-1970) began 
when three Igbo majority states declared independence.  The Nigerian military won a 
slow war of attrition resulting in 45,000 battle-related deaths and the starvation deaths of 
one-half million civilians (Mullenbach, 2018).  Next, the Nigeria-Muslim War (1980–
1981) was fought between the Nigerian government and Muslim fundamentalist in Kano 
province.  A rapid Nigerian military victory resulted in slightly over 1,000 battle-related 
deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Next, the extra-state Jukun-Tiv War (1991–1992) 
was fought between two ethnic groups in eastern Nigeria.  The deployment of national 
forces ended the fighting that had caused more than 1,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees 
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& Wayman, 2010).  Finally, the Boko Haram War began with one-sided violence in 
2009, progressed to the level of war in 2012, and is currently ongoing.  The war is fought 
by the joint effort of the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad against the 
Boko Haram militant group.  The total number of battle-related deaths is difficult to 
ascertain but believed to be well over 20,000 (Matfess, 2017).  
Peace Operations.  See the Regional Peace Interventions section below for a 
description of the counter-Boko Haram Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) peace 
enforcement mission.  
Rwanda 
Conflicts.  Rwanda has reached the level of war five times.  Each time has been 
the result of ethnic tensions between the elite Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority.  The 
Rwandan Social Revolution (1959-1962) began pre-independence as a Hutu reaction to 
future Tutsi rule.  The war ended with the Tutsi king being deposed and 20,000 battle 
related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Next, the First Rwanda War (1963-1964) 
occurred when exiled Tutsi’s attempted a return to power.  The war ended with a Hutu 
military victory and 1,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  The Second 
Rwanda War (1994) and the associated genocide was fought between the Tutsi Rwanda 
Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu government.  The war ended with an RPF military 
victory and an end to the genocide.  However, more than a million people were killed in 
the conflict and related genocide (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Then the  
Third Rwanda War (1997-1998) and Fourth Rwandan War (2001) each began with a 
Hutu offensive launched from the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the intention 
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of regaining central control of Rwanda.  In each war the attack was repulsed, and the 
government remained in control.  The Third and Fourth Rwandan Wars combined 
produced approximately 5,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).     
Peace Operations.  Rwanda played host to seven peace operations in the time 
directly before and after the 1994 genocide.  The first three missions were all OAU led 
observer mission employed to monitor cease fire agreements.  The OAU Military 
Observer Team (OAU MOT) deployed 15 personnel from April to September 1991.  The 
mission was replaced by the 40-person OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (OAU 
NMOG) that served from September 1991 to July 1992.  OAU NMOG I sought to 
improve on the OAU MOT model by employing personnel from non-interested nations.  
OAU NMOG II replaced OAU NMOG I.  It deployed from August 1992 until November 
1993.  OAU NMOG II increased the troop strength to 132 personnel in an attempt to 
better document the violence (Berman & Sams, 2000).  The UN Observer Mission 
Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) deployed to southern Uganda in response to OAU NMOG 
II reporting of armed groups operating on the Uganda-Rwanda border in June 1993.  
UNOMUR’s 81 personnel were tasked with monitoring the activities of armed groups on 
the border (United Nations, 2001).   
The growing tension as reported by OAU NMOG II and UNOMUR led to the 
creation of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR I) in October 1993.  
UNAMIR I was a 444-person peacekeeping mission that sought to ensure 
implementation of the peace agreement and protect civilians.  It failed at both as the 
Rwanda genocide and the Second Rwanda War began under its mandate.  In May 1994 
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UNAMIR I transitioned to UNAMIR II with an increase to 5,737 total personnel and a 
more robust mandate to protect civilians, support reconciliation, and train security forces 
(United Nations, 2001).  UNOMUR was withdrawn in September 1994 as it was no 
longer relevant to monitor the border with Uganda.  The French peace enforcing 
Operation Turquoise was deployed from June to July 1994 to provide a humanitarian 
safety zone in Rwanda’s west (United Nations, 2001).  Peace failed to be resilient as the 
Third Rwanda War began one year after UNAMIR II’s withdrawal in March 1996.     
Sierra Leone 
Conflicts.  The First and Second Sierra Leone Wars together compose a decade of 
intrastate conflict between 1991 and 2000 with a pause in the fighting from 1997-1999.  
The First Sierra Leone War (1991-1996) was fought between the Revolutionary United 
front (RUF) supported by Liberia and the government of Sierra Leone assisted by South 
African mercenaries.  The war ended in a peace agreement and caused an estimated 
25,000 conflict deaths occurred in the war (Mullenbach, 2018).  Next, the Second Sierra 
Leone War (1998-2000) was started by an alliance of anti-RUF local security forces, 
ECOMOG forces, and the British Sandline mercenary group with the intention of 
wresting power from the RUF.  The RUF received support from Burkina Faso and 
Liberia in their ensuing “Operation No Living Thing” scorched earth campaign.  The war 
ended with another peace agreement.  Total battle related deaths are unknown for this 
conflict, but estimates are over 100,000 for the 1991-2000 decade of fighting.  
Peace Operations.  Sierra Leone hosted five peace operations in response to the 
First and Second Sierra Leone Wars.  The 9,000-person ECOWAS Military Observer 
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Group-Sierra Leone (ECOMOG-SL) peace enforcement mission deployed from June 
1997 to May 2000.  ECOMOG-SL was able to force an end to the First Seirra Leone War 
but failed to prevent the onset of the Second Sierra Leone War (Mullenbach, 2018).  The 
217-person UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) monitoring mission was 
deployed July 1998 to October 1999.  UNOMSIL partnered with ECOMOG-SL 
providing assistance in monitoring a cease-fire agreement.  UNOMSIL transitioned to the 
18,329-person UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacebuilding mission in 
October 1999.  UNAMSIL remained in place until December 2005.  UNAMSIL was 
tasked with providing security, building institutions, and overseeing elections in to build 
a positive peace (United Nations, 2009).  Two UK Missions assisted UNAMSIL.  The 
1,300-person peace enforcement mission, Operation Palliser, deployed May to June 2000 
with a mandate to defeat the RUF.  Operation Palliser transitioned to Operation Basilica 
and Silkman, a 250-personnel peacebuilding operation supporting security force 
development, in June 2000.  Operation Basilica and Silkman and UNAMSIL both closed 
in 2005 leaving behind a resilient peace (Ucko, 2016). 
Somalia and Ogaden 
Conflicts.  Somalia has experience five post-World War II wars.  The first two 
wars, the First (1963-1964) and Second (1976-1980) Ogaden Wars began as inter-state 
conflict with Ethiopia.  In the First Ogaden War the Somali government supported the 
Western Somali Liberation Front’s (WSLF) successionist campaign against the Ethiopian 
government that was supported by Cuban and Soviet forces.  The Ogaden wars ended 
with an Ethiopian battle field victory and estimated 60,000 battle field deaths (Sarkees & 
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Wayman, 2010).  The First (1988-1991), Second (1991-1997), and Third (2006-2012) 
Somali Wars all emerged from the state collapse caused by the Somali defeat in the 
Ogaden wars.  The Somali central government was defeated by a coalition of the Somali 
National Movement (SNM), Somali National Alliance (SNA), the Somali Salvation 
Alliance (SSA), and the United Somali Congress (USC) in the First Somalia War.  The 
war resulted in 5,000 battle related deaths.  The Second Somalia War grew from the 
disintegration of the coalition force that had won the First Somali War.  The war ended 
with a peace agreement.  Estimates of battlefield deaths vary from 32,000 to 100,000 
(Mullenbach, 2018).  Finally, the Third Somalia War was contested between the 
internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and various Islamic 
groups led by Al Shabab and the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts.  The TFG was 
supported by AU peace enforcement mission AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia); as 
well as the militaries of Kenya, Ethiopia, the United States, and France.  The war ended 
with a TFG military victory.  Total battle related deaths estimates vary between three and 
twelve thousand. 
Peace Operations.  Five Peace operations have been deployed in response to the 
Second (1991-1997) and Third (2006-20012) Somali Wars.  The 947-person 
peacekeeping UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) deployed in April 1992 to 
monitor a cease fire agreement and permit the delivery of humanitarian assistance.  The 
37,000-person Unified Task Force (also known as Operation Restore Hope) peace 
enforcement operation was deployed to bolster UNOSOM I efforts in December 1992.  
The Unified Task Force was a US led coalition of 27 nations.  UNOSOM I and the 
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Unified Task Force merged into the UN led UNOSOM II peace building operation in 
March 1993 (United Nations, 2001).  UNOSOM II was a 30,800-person peacebuilding 
operation with responsibility to permit humanitarian assistance, provide security, and 
oversee demobilization efforts.  UNOSOM II was closed in March 1995 due to 
international frustration at the pace of change and the continuation of the conflict (United 
Nations, 2003).     
The Third Somali War erupted in 2006.  The AU took the lead in response with 
the formation of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  AMISOM is a 22,126-person 
peace enforcement mission tasked with establishing the peace and setting the conditions 
necessary for handover to Somali authorities. AMISOM has been deployed since January 
2007 (African Union, 2018).  The EU Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) is a 193-person 
peace building operation that leads security sector reform and training initiatives in 
support of AMISOM.  The EUTM Somalia has been deployed since April 2010 
(European Union, 2018).  Both missions remain deployed and the conflict continues at a 
less than war level.  
South Africa 
Conflicts.  South Africa’s anti-apartheid violence began almost immediately 
following independence in 1961 and continued until the election of Nelson Mandela to 
president in 1994.  However, only once did the violence reach the level of war.  The 
Inkatha-ANC War (1987-1994) pitted the apartheid government supported Inkatha 
political group against the Soviet and Angolan supported African National Congress 
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(ANC). The war caused 20,000 battle related deaths and ended on the election of Nelson 
Mandela, an ANC leader, to president in 1994 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). 
Peace Operations.  One peace operation complimented with numerous civil 
assistance and monitoring missions was deployed to ease the end of apartheid minority 
rule in South Africa.  The Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group South Africa 
(CPAG-SA) was a 33-person peace building operation that deployed from February to 
April 1994.  CPAG-SA performed security sector reform in support of the formation of 
the newly integrated South African Defense Forces (Canadian Defense Forces, 2017).  
CPAG-SA was complimented by the UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), 
the European Community Observer Mission in South Africa (ECOMSA), and the OAU 
Observer Mission in South Africa (OAUOMSA) civil missions that observed the 
transition of power and conduct of elections from September 1992 to June 1994 (United 
Nations, 2007).  South Africa has not returned to intra-state war following the 
redeployment of the operation. 
South Sudan 
Conflicts.  South Sudan has been locked into near perpetual conflict over who 
should govern the region.  The First (1963-1972) and Second (1983-2005) South Sudan 
Wars were wars of succession fought by the Christian south against the Muslim 
dominated government in Khartoum.  The SPLA Division War (1991-1992) and the 
South Sudanese Civil War (2012-2015) were conflicts between southern leaders and 
ethnic groups. The First South Sudan War was between the southern Anya-Nya group 
supported by Israel and the northern government supported by Egypt, the Soviet Union, 
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and other Socialist powers.  The war ended in a peace agreement and left an estimated 
one-half million dead.  The Second South Sudan War was fought along similar lines. The 
southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebelled in response to the north’s 
attempted imposition of Islamic Sharia law on the Christian south.  The Sudanese 
government was aided by Libya, Iran, and Eritrea.  The southern cause was aided by 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Israel.  Ethiopia alternated between providing support to the 
government and the rebels.  The Second South Sudan War ended in an agreement that led 
to South Sudanese independence and caused 100,000 battle-related deaths.  The 
intracommunal SPLA Division War was fought between southern splinter groups.  The 
war ended when splinter groups refocused their efforts against the north and caused 1,200 
battle related deaths.  Finally, the South Sudan Civil War fought between southern 
leaders who relied extensively on ethnic loyalties to drive their supporters to take up arms 
against one-another.  The Ugandan military and the Darfurian Justice and Equality 
Movement militia intervened on behalf of the government.  The war has been resilient 
through many agreements and continues at a less than war level.  The war has resulted in 
50,000 combat related deaths as of 2015 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).   
Peace Operations.  Four peace operations have deployed to South Sudan.  The 
25-person, UN led, Joint Military Commission and International Monitoring Unit (JMC 
and IMU) monitoring mission was deployed from April 2002 to June 2005 to monitor the 
SPLA withdrawal from the Nuba Mountains (Mullenbach, 2018).  The 14,799-person 
peacebuilding UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) deployed in March 2005 following the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (United Nations, 2011).  UNMIS 
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was tasked with assisting in demobilization, leading security sector reform, providing 
rule of law support, and conducting elections assistance.  UNMIS was replaced in the 
18,013-person UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacebuilding operation in June 
2011 following the declaration of South Sudanese independence.  UNMISS added peace 
enforcement protection of civilians language to the previous mandate (United Nations, 
2018).  The 4,803-person UN Interim Security Force for Abyei Area (UNISFA) 
peacekeeping mission was also started in June 2011.  UNISFA is responsible for 
preventing a return to conflict between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan in the 
disputed Abyei area (United Nations, 2018).  Both UNMISS and UNISFA continue to the 
present and struggle to contain the high levels of violence that remain endemic to South 
Sudan. 
Sudan (Darfur) 
Conflicts.  Pastoral agrarian and ethnic tensions have reached the level of war in 
Darfur one-time.  The Darfur War (2003-2006) was fought between Black agrarian tribes 
and Arab nomadic herders.  The black tribes were represented by the Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); each of which sought 
Darfurian autonomy and received support from Chad.  The Arab tribes were represented 
by pro-government Janjaweed militias supported by the Sudanese government.  The 
conflict was reduced to a less than war level following the signing of a peace agreement. 
At least 2.5 million people were displaced and between 200,000 and 400,000 died 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  
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Peace Operations.  Four peace operations have deployed in response to Sudan’s 
Darfur Rebellion.  The 390-person AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS 1) monitoring operation 
deployed from April to October 2004 to observe and report on the conflict.  AMIS 1 was 
replaced by the 7,641-person peacekeeping AMIS 2 operation in October 2004.  AMIS 
2’s mandate included responsibility to prevent resumption of hostilities by providing a 
buffer between warring groups.  The EU Support Mission to AMIS 2 was a 150-person 
peacekeeping mission deployed July 2005 to December 2007 to assist AMIS 2 in its 
peacekeeping responsibilities (European Union, 2018).  AMIS 2 was replaced by a joint 
UN/AU mission in July 2007.  The UN and AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is a 
23,448 person peacebuilding mission tasked with preventing a return to conflict, 
facilitating intercommunal dialogue, and the protection of civilians (United Nations, 
2018).  UNAMID remains in place to the present and the conflict remains at a less than 
war level. 
Uganda 
Conflicts.  Four wars have contested the question of who should lead Uganda.  
The First Uganda War (1966) occurred when the Baganda tribe attempted to depose 
Prime Minister Obote.  The war ended with a government victory and 1,000 battle related 
deaths.  Next, the Ugandan-Tanzanian War (1978–1979) was fought between the 
Ugandan government supported by Libya and the Uganda National Liberation Army 
(UNLA) supported by Tanzania.  The war ended in a rebel victory and resulted in 3,000 
battle related deaths; civilian casualties were estimated at 500,000.  Next, the Second 
Uganda War (1980-1986) was contested between the ruling UNLA and Yoweri 
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Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA).  The war ended in a rebel victory.  Total 
battle deaths are estimated at 46,000 and civilian deaths are estimated to be 800,000.  
Finally, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) attempted to seize power in the Holy Spirit 
Movement War (1986-1987).  The HSM was defeated in a pitched battle in 1987.  The 
war caused 7,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  
Peace Operations.  UNOMUR was the only peace operation based in Uganda.  
However, its mission was wholly focused on the conflict in Rwanda.  UNOMUR’s 81 
personnel deployed to Uganda’s southern border and monitored the activities of armed 
groups on the border from June 1993 to September 1994 (United Nations, 2001). 
Western Sahara 
Conflicts.  Western Sahara has experienced one war.  The Western Sahara War 
(1975-1983) was fought between the Polisario Front supported by Algeria against 
Morocco in one sector and against Mauritania in another.  The war ended in a UN 
brokered ceasefire and resulted in 16,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 
2010).     
Peace Operations.  Two missions have been deployed in response to the Western 
Sahara War.  The 90-person OAU Mission to Western Sahara monitoring mission 
deployed from January to April 1991 to conduct fact finding operations (Williams, 2016).  
The 10,177-person UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) 
peacekeeping mission replaced the OAU mission in April 1991.  MINURSO added 
cease-fire observance to the mandate and remains in place to the present (United Nations, 




Conflicts.  The Rhodesia War (1972-1979) fought by various Black resistance 
movements against Rhodesian White minority rule was Zimbabwe’s only war.  The 
Soviet supported Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Chinese supported 
Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) battled the South African and 
Mozambican backed government.  The war took place over seven years of harsh guerrilla 
fighting.  The war ended in a negotiated settlement followed by the former rebel Robert 
Mugabe’s electoral victory.  The war caused 11,000 battle-related deaths.    
Peace Operations.  Zimbabwe has not hosted any peace operations. 
Regional Peace Interventions 
Two recent peace enforcement operations take a regional approach.  The Multi-
National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a conglomeration of the efforts of Nigeria, Chad, 
Cameroon, Niger, and Benin to confront the Boko Haram terrorist group.  The MNJTF is 
authorized by an AU mandate and seeks to coordinate efforts to restore peace in the 
region.  It formed in October 2014 and has approximately 10,000 troops assigned to it 
(Assanvo, Ella, Abatan, & Sawadogo, 2016).  The French Operation Barkhane is another 
a regional peace enforcement operation.  Operation Barkhane’s 3,000 troops began 
operations in August 2014.  Barkhane supports MINUSMA in Mali and national 
governments throughout the Sahel with counter terror focused enforcement capabilities 
(French Ministry of Defense , 2018).  Both these operations, and the conflicts they seek 
to ameliorate, continue to the present time.  
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Conflict Patterns Across African States 
African conflicts have proven resilient and African peace fragile.  Many countries 
have found themselves in the throes of four or five sequential wars all drawn from the 
same conflict conditions.  Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Chad, Somalia, Uganda, and others have had four, five, or even six wars generated from 
the same basic conditions.  Outside interventions have been both a positive and a 
negative force.  On the negative side, some interventions have directly contributed to 
violence and others have been ineffectual at halting it.  Regional actors joining Africa’s 
World War grew the conflict creating the deadliest conflict since World War II.  
UNAMIR I’s presence served mainly to observe and document an ongoing genocide.   
However, other interventions have halted violence and stabilized fractured societies.  
UNTAG is frequently credited with transforming Namibia from a conflict torn society 
into a stable middle-income country.   
The reasons for conflict and war in African states changed little over time.  Most 
conflicts related to identity issues (ethnic, religious, tribal affiliations) and the quest for 
power over who would be the dominant actor in these nascent national governments.  
These conflicts escalated due to the fragility of post-colonial institutions that were not 
adequately developed in the pre-independence period (Williams, 2016). 
The pattern of outside interventions in African conflicts, has however, changed 
significantly.  Before 1990, individual states seeking to pursue national interest engaged 
in Africa’s wars.  The United States, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and others engaged 
in proxy fights perceived to be the front lines between the communist and capitalist 
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worlds.  The only notable peace operation during this time was ONUC in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, designed to stabilize Katanga province.  Since 1990, peace 
operation interventions increased exponentially in Africa: over 80 operations were 
organized through 2015. 
The end of the Cold War presented two changes:  first, regimes that relied on 
superpower support destabilized as they no longer received military and financial 
assistance from the U.S. or the USSR, or their funding was significantly reduced; and 
second, the original purpose of the UN Security Council to keep peace in the world was 
restored as superpower rivalry exercised through the gridlock of veto power dissolved. 
The deployment of police and/or military forces to support international peace 
and security grew exponentially in post-Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa.  In 1989 and 1990 
two operations per year were initiated.  In 1991 the number was five and in 1992 seven 
new operations were initiated.  The quantity of interventions has ebbed and flowed from 
that time to the present.  However, the international community has remained constant in 
its support for the presence of interventions to support national and regional issues in 
Africa (Williams, 2016). 
Peace operations deployed to 23 sub-Saharan African countries have been led by 
the UN, the Organization for African Unity/African Union, the European Union, regional 
economic communities, ad hoc coalitions and individual countries2.  Their tasks have 
                                                 
2 Two recent peace enforcement operations take a regional approach.  The Multi-National Joint Task Force 
(MNJTF) is a conglomeration of the efforts of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin to confront the 
Boko Haram terrorist group.  The MNJTF is authorized by an AU mandate and seeks to coordinate efforts 
to restore peace in the region.  It formed in October 2014 and has approximately 10,000 troops assigned to 
it (Assanvo, Ella, Abatan, & Sawadogo, 2016).  The French Operation Barkhane is another a regional peace 
enforcement operation.  Operation Barkhane’s 3,000 troops began operations in August 2014.  Barkhane 
supports MINUSMA in Mali and national governments throughout the Sahel with counter terror focused 
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been designed to assist in the prevention or cessation of armed conflict by serving to 
observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; enforcement of 
ceasefires or peace agreements; or to build a stable peace (Williams, 2013).   
  
                                                 
enforcement capabilities (French Ministry of Defense , 2018).  Both these operations, and the conflicts they 








CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
This study examined all sub-Saharan peace operations that occurred from 1990 
through 2015.  There were 86 missions spread across 23 African states.  The main 
question addressed is: Did the intervention force achieve a desired peaceful outcome and 
was that peace, if established, resilient?  These operations were led by a multitude of 
organizations covering a variety of mission objectives.  It is assumed that the nature of a 
conflict dictates the design and mandate for any peace operation, that in turn, determines 
the required force capabilities deemed necessary for implementation.  Mission success 
requires the appropriate match of intervenor capability to deal with the conflict situation.  
The chain leading to failure develops when a mandate does not address the conflict issues 
or the force capacity is inadequate to meet mandate requirements.  
Hypotheses 
To test the linkage between conflict characteristics, mandate features, and 
intervenor capacity, the following nine hypotheses were tested: 
1. The conflict characteristics determine the peace operation mandate. 
2. Peace operations mandate determines the force capacity. 
3. The force capacity determines peace operations outcome. 
4. The intervening organization is a predictor of peace operations outcomes. 
5. Robust mandates produce higher peace operation success rates.   
6. Sequential operations lead to greater peace operation success rates.   
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7. Force capacity with parallel support missions leads to greater peace operations 
success. 
8. Force capacity with Western power assistance programs will lead to greater 
peace operation success rates. 
9. Force capacity that includes both a parallel supporting mission and a Western 
Power assistance program will produce the greatest rates of peace operations 
success.  
Key Variables 
The independent variables fall in three broad categories; conflict characteristics, 
mandate features, and force composition/capacity.  The variables that compose the three 
categories are detailed below along with their indicators and coding. 
Conflict Characteristics.  Peace operations must deal with the conditions of the 
conflict into which they are deployed.  Some of these conditions or characteristics inhibit 
the success of peace operations.  Other conditions may make success more likely or have 
no discernable effect.  Studies by Fortna (2004, 2008); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); 
Fiedler (2000); Diehl and Balas (2014); and Walter (2010) have examined the effects of 
conflict characteristics.  Each study has explored characteristics that make a conflict 
resilient to peace and reduce the likelihood of intervention success.  Variables discussed 
below are categorized into belligerent characteristics, conflict issues, and level/duration 
of violence.  The analysis of complexity allows the author to compensate for the fact that 
missions are not randomly assigned in analysis of the interrelationship between conflict 
and mandate (Sambanis, 2008).             
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The greater the number of belligerent groups the greater the number of potential 
spoilers to any peace deal (Diehl & Druckman, 2015).  Multiple groups provide the 
opportunity for an equal number of objections to any peace agreement and create great 
difficulty in the complexity of interpositional separation and DDR operations.  Doyle & 
Sambanis (2006) and Fortna (2004) each found a direct correlation between the number 
of belligerent groups and the likelihood of violence resurgence.    
The presence of external support to both the government and the opposition by 
regional powers has been shown to have a corrosive impact on peace interventions.  
Arms, materiel, or direct troop intervention are considered to be direct support to a 
belligerent party.  Support to the government produces a reluctance of the government to 
make peace prior to a full battlefield victory.  Support to the opposition enables rebel 
forces to remain in the field extending conflicts that may have otherwise lessened or 
concluded.  External support to either party was negative, but support to rebels had the 
greater effect on increasing the duration of conflict (Diehl & Balas, 2014).   
Wealthy nations were found to recover better from and have lower rates of relapse 
from intra-state wars.  Potential combatants in wealthy nations had better alternative 
opportunities for gain (Diehl & Balas, 2014).  These opportunities created drivers away 
from conflict.  Essentially, a lack of wealth increased the likelihood of recidivism (Doyle 
& Sambanis, 2006).            
Characteristics found in the conflict issues, those reasons why groups fight, also 
impact the challenge of intervention.  Categories such as resource conflicts; ethnic or 
religious conflicts; separatist conflicts; and/or intra-state conflicts have all been found to 
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impact the challenge of intervention.  Previous studies have found each of these 
categories to have a direct impact on the likelihood that intervention will produce 
resilient peace.  
Resource conflicts are those that either the primary motivation or sustainment of a 
belligerent group was raw resources.  The Liberia and Sierra Leone Civil Wars were 
seminal examples of resource conflicts.  Each conflict centered on control of and was 
funded by diamonds.  Conflicts fueled by lootable resources resist agreement and are 
more likely to experience recidivism (Walter, 2010).  Both Fortna (2008) and Sambanis 
(2008) found this variable to have the greatest impact of any measured independent 
variable on the likelihood a return to violence.   
 Conflicts with an identity, ethnic or religious, element increase the difficulty of 
response.  Forces divided along these identity lines find it easier to mobilize support and 
are more resilient once fighting has begun (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).  Ethnicity was the 
mobilization tool utilized in the Rwanda genocide.  Similarly, identity has been employed 
as a mobilization tool by rebel groups in South Sudan who are unable to pay or use other 
means of coercion towards collective violence.  Religious identities have been used to 
mobilize in a similar manner (Williams, 2016).  Fortna (2008), Sambanis (2008), and 
Walter each found identity issues second only to resource issues regarding degree of 
impact on the resiliency of a post-civil war peace.  Identity has been especially pernicious 
conflict characteristic due to its ability to mobilize on behalf of groups otherwise lacking 
means.     
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Intrastate conflicts are more likely to return to war than interstate conflicts 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  This is true for wars for central control, regional internal 
wars, and intercommunal wars.  Wars for central control are civil wars in which two or 
more belligerents compete for sovereignty over the territory of a state.  Belligerents may 
have the support of outside entities but remain primarily composed of those from that 
state such as in the 1992-1994 Angolan War of the Cities (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  
The second intrastate war sub-group is regional internal war.  These wars are those in are 
contested between regional states, but in the geographic confines of one state.  Africa’s 
World War, 1998-2002, is one such conflict.  All conflict took place within the borders of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo despite there being over a dozen state and non-
state actors participating in the conflict (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  Intercommunal 
conflicts are the final type of intrastate war.  These conflicts take place within one state 
and are contested by non-state actors.  These have rarely received international 
intervention.  The First (1991-1992) and Second (2004) Nigerian Christian-Muslim Wars 
are two such conflicts (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  These forms of intrastate wars create 
challenges to successful intervention due to the frequency that belligerent groups split 
and regroup as well as the durability of identity issues as a grievance.    
Peace interventions into separatist conflicts have a greater likelihood of success 
than other types of intrastate-war.  Separatist conflicts are those in which a rebel group 
holds the intention to form a new state as key to their platform.  They are in effect a 
conflict over the right exercise sovereignty over a specific geographic section of an 
existing state and differ from other intrastate conflicts in which two or more groups 
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compete for the right to govern the existing territorial boundaries of a state in its entirety.  
Most post-independence African separatist conflicts have been at their heart conflicts to 
reform the state.  Elites from marginalized groups have launched conflicts to gain access 
to patrimonial networks that have been denied to them (Williams, 2016).  Elites in these 
conflicts are generally more prone to negotiate peace and that peace is more likely to hold 
than in other intra-state conflict types.  Separatist are on whole slightly less likely to 
experience recidivism as compared to non-separatist conflicts (Fortna, 2008). 
 Inter-state wars present a simpler problem set to an intervenor.  Inter-state wars 
generally present an agreed on boundary on which to interposition forces to prevent a 
resumption of violence.  Inter-state wars also, generally are dyadic in nature and 
composed of groups able to make and keep commitments to treaties and agreements 
(Diehl & Balas, 2014).  Intra-state wars are chaotic and multifaceted compared to inter-
state.  Inter-state wars make up only three of the conflicts in my study but have a 100% 
complete success rate compared with a rate near 50% for all relevant intra-state conflicts.    
 The duration and intensity of violence also impacts the likelihood of intervention 
success.  Deaths per annum and duration of violence each correlate toward an increased 
likelihood for renewed violence and lower chances for peace operation success (Fortna, 
2008).  These “enduring rivalries” create heightened and hardened feelings of enmity 
between groups.  This in turn produces climates in which compromise with former 
enemies is politically unpalatable (Diehl & Balas, 2014). 
 Phase of conflict at intervention has a statistical impact on the challenge of 
intervention (Diehl & Balas, 2014; Jett, 1999).  Pre-violence conflict prevention is 
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theoretically well suited to intervention but currently lacks a significant number of 
examples for generalization.  Active-violence is the most complex and ill-suited to 
traditional peace keeping operations.  Active-violence requires troops to be well armed, 
well trained, and provided with a robust mandate to carry out the required action 
(Boulden, 2001).  Post-agreement interventions present the best opportunity for success 
and face the fewest obstacles.  Post-peace agreement is less complex than post-cease fire 
based on historical outcomes (Diehl P. F., 1994).  The final category, post-agreement 
with residual violence, presents the issues of capacity endemic to the active violence 
phase, but with a greater likelihood of combat abatement.  This increased probability of 
success is resultant from the belligerents demonstrated ability to make an agreement as 
well as the existence of a previous agreement to utilize as a starting point of future 
negotiations. 
The consent of all belligerent forces for the intervention greatly enhance the 
probability of intervention success (Diehl & Balas, 2014; Fortna, 2008; Fiedler, 2000).  
Major studies to have been unanimous in agreeing that consent has a demonstrable 
positive impact on the likelihood of intervention success.  The resistance of even one 
group can open the intervening force to sabotage and/or make them the target of attack.  
1993’s Black Hawk Down incident, that resulted in the withdrawal of UNITAF forces, 
was endemic of this effect.  I captured consent by measuring the presence of a cease fire 
or peace agreement.  Post-peace agreement peace operation deployments are predicated 
on the consent of the belligerents.  The presence of post-agreement continued violence 
was indicative of the lack of a credible commitment to peace.  The Second South Sudan 
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War, 1983-2005, and the South Sudanese Civil War, 2013-Present, are classic example of 
this phenomenon where the opposing sides use agreements as strategic moves rather than 
genuine efforts towards conflict resolution (Kalpakian, 2017).   
Variables that have been found to have no discernable effect on the probability of 
success are not utilized in this study.  Type of government and geographic size of mission 
responsibility have been omitted due to an agreement among previous studies on their 
lack of impact on outcomes.  Walter (2010) and Sambanis (2008) each found type of 
government to have no statistical impact; while Fortuna (2004) and Sambanis (2008) 
found geographical size and features to have little or no effect on outcomes.  Table 3.1 
summarizes the set of conflict characteristics indicators, measurement and sources. 
Conflict complexity was a qualitative assessment of the level of challenge a 
conflict presents to a theoretical peace operation.  The measure was based on the 
summation of the independent variables discussed above.  Those conflicts that have a 
preponderance of the complicating factors were said to be highly complex.  Africa’s 
World War is the archetype for a highly complex conflict.  The war has a long duration of 
conflict, numerous belligerent groups, identity issues, external support to belligerents, 
readily exploitable resources, no agreed on peace plan, lacks the consent of the 
belligerents, has a low capacity for state building, and other numerous factors 
complicating any peace intervention.  A medium complexity conflict has some, but not 
most or all of these factors.  For example, the Angolan War of the Cities had 
complicating factors such as large numbers of organized armed individuals, highly 
exploitable resources, and a long pre-intervention duration of violence.  However, the 
 
 58 
war had some advantages such as a higher than average GDP, only two active belligerent 
groups, and limited external support to either group.  A low complexity conflict may have 
some complicating factors, but does not have a majority of issues associated with 
resistance to intervention.  For example, the War of the Azouzou Strip did have high 
casualty numbers and was a resource-based conflict.  However, the conflict had a peace 
agreement in place, was interstate, and had been fought for a short duration.  These three 
gradients of complexity are necessary to facilitate the comparison of various peace 
operations acknowledging that they are not deployed in a vacuum (Diehl & Balas, 2014).  
A summary of conflict characteristics including variables and indicators is displayed in 
Table 3.1.     
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Table 3.1. Conflict Characteristics 
   





 Government vs. 1 opposition? Yes/No 
 Number of opposing sides: (2, 3, or >3) 
 Size of forces of each side 
 External support to government? Yes/No Who? What? 





 Intrastate Conflict? Yes/No 
 Resource Distribution? Yes/No 
 Ethnic/Religious Discrimination? Yes/No 





Annual deaths due to political violence 
 
 
Elapsed time to intervention 
 
Number of months from violence onset until intervention 
 
 
Conflict Phase at Intervention  
 
 Pre-Violence 
 Active Violence (No Agreement)  






Per-Capita GDP measured via Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)  
 
   
Sources: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2018); Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees 
(2016); Mullenbach (2018); International Peace Institute (2018); World Bank   
(2018).  
 
Mandates.  Mandates are instructions provided from the lead organization or 
country convening the peace operation.  The mandate instructions or tasks dictate the 
mission’s responsibilities and authorizations.  Operations can be classified based on the 
contents of these instruction and fall into four basic categories; peace monitoring 
missions, traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacebuilding (Sandler, 2017).  
The 86 missions meeting the criteria of this study have each been categorized into one of 
these four categories based on a careful reading of their individual operational guidelines 
and deployed areas of effort.  
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Peace monitoring, sometimes also referred to as observation, missions are the 
least complex of all peace operations.  Monitoring missions are small deployments of 
observers deployed to perform fact-finding observation of specific actions and report 
findings to the lead organization (Fortna, 2003).  Monitoring missions may be deployed 
prior to violence (OMIC 3 and MIOC), during active conflict (OMIB), or post 
ceasefire/peace agreement (UNAVEM I).  These missions may act as stand-alone 
operations or may be deployed to gather information to be used in the construction of a 
more robust operation to be deployed when the situation is viewed as appropriate (Balas, 
2011).   
Traditional peacekeeping, also referred to as interpositional missions and here 
referred to only as peacekeeping, deploy in support of a cease fire with the intent to 
promote an environment suitable for conflict resolution.  Peacekeeping missions establish 
an interpositional buffer between combatants following a ceasefire.  The presence of this 
buffer seeks to prevent conflict recidivism and enable the conditions necessary for a 
permanent peace agreement to be reached.  Peacekeeping mission mandates are designed 
around the ‘holy-trinity’ of host-nation consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of 
force (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010).  Peacekeeping missions are facilitative and 
as such do not directly engage in diplomatic initiatives (Diehl & Balas, 2014).  These 
missions may work in concert with other missions or as standalone interventions. 
Peace enforcements missions seek to end hostilities between warring sides with 
active military force.  Enforcement missions require a larger military capacity than peace 
monitoring or peacekeeping mission types.  Enforcement operations conduct offensive 
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military operations to force the conditions for peace through punishment of those 
responsible for hostilities.  The missions may or may not have the consent of the host-
nation and/or belligerents.  Peace enforcement missions often work in parallel to or as a 
precursor to other missions that seek to build a positive peace (Diehl & Balas, 2014).   
Peacebuilding operations are the most complex of peace operation mandates.  
Peacebuilding operations seek the creation of a new environment; not the mere cessation 
of hostilities.  Peacebuilding operations are frequently tasked with disarming warring 
parties, destroying weapons, conducting security sector reform, facilitating elections, 
strengthening government institutions, and numerous other activities (Diehl & Balas, 
2014).  Peacebuilding missions may be standalone missions tasked with peacekeeping 
responsibilities in addition to their transformative tasks (ONUB), parallel missions that 
support an existing peacekeeping operation with specific tasks (Operation Basilica and 
Silkman), or be a multi-dimensional stabilization mission with a robust combination of 
peace enforcement and peace building responsibilities (MINUSMA, MONUSCO).  
Peacebuilding missions require the greatest international commitment in terms of troop 
numbers and financial investment (Sandler, 2017).    
Robust peacekeeping or robust mandates are terms used to describe peace 
enforcement and peacebuilding operations that employ force to deter attempts to disrupt 
the political process, protect civilians, and/or assist in maintaining law and order.  These 
mandates frequently include language authorizing the use of all necessary means to 
defend the mandate.  The offensive use of force differentiates robust from traditional 
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operations (United Nations, 2018; Sandler, 2017).  Traditional peacekeeping allowed for 
use of force only in defense of the peacekeeping force itself (Diehl & Balas, 2014).   
Robust mandates were a necessary evolution of peace operations due to the 
conflict environments that forces were deployed post-Cold War.  Cold War traditional 
peacekeeping operations operated under the holy trinity of host nation consent, 
impartiality, and minimum use of force.  Cold War missions were deployed to relatively 
stable post ceasefire or peace agreement situations.  In contrast, post-Cold War missions 
have been frequently deployed to fractured civil wars.  In these situations, there is often 
no peace to keep.  There may either be no cease-fire/peace agreement or there are spoiler 
parties not beholden agreement.   
Robust mandates have added coercive force to more appropriately address these 
complex environments.  The missions are considerably larger than traditional missions 
and employ more offensive capability.  Robust operations are by design offensively 
capable with increased weaponry, forces frequently larger than 20,000 troops, and rules 
of engagement permitting offensive action (Williams, 2013). 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 detail mandate types and characteristics.  Table 3.2 lists the 
four mandate categories with their definition.  These definitions were the criteria used in 
categorization of individual operations in this study.  Table 3.3 provides more detailed 
information on characteristics common to each type of mandate.   
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Peace Monitoring  
 
A fact-finding mission observing specific actions and reporting findings 




Deployment of troops following a ceasefire agreement to serve as an 
interpositional buffer between belligerents; requires the consent of all 
parties to the conflict, impartiality, and the minimum use of force; goal is 
to prevent the resumption of hostilities by preventing accidental 
engagement of opposing forces, deliberate cheating on ceasefire terms, 




Proactive missions designed to restore peace and redress aggression with 





The creation of a new environment, not merely the cessation of hostilities, 
dedicated to decreasing the opportunity to resort to violence and creating 
mechanisms to manage conflicts peacefully. 
Source: Sandler (2017). 
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Table 3.3. Mandate Tasks Variables 
  
Incorporated into Peace- 
Variable 
 
Monitoring Keeping  Enforcement Building 
Observe and Report Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Physical Separation of Belligerents  
 
No Yes Yes No 
Consent of the Belligerents 
 
Yes Yes No Sometimes 
Demilitarization of Belligerents: 
     Disarmament 
     Demobilization 
     Reintegration   
 








Government Capacity Development: 
     Organize Elections 










Required Size of Force  30-100 100-1000 1,000-10,000 
 
>5,000 
Intervenor Armament Capabilities: 
     Small Arms 
     Armored Vehicles 














Sources: Diehl and Balas (2014); Sandler (2017); Williams (2016). 
Force Composition and Capacity.  The organizing agency and troop contributors 
have a direct impact on the capacity of a mission to employ its mandated tasks.  The 
agency and the troops assigned must implement the mission mandate.  It is therefore 
essential for the agency to be able to manage the mission and for the troops to be capable 
to carry out the tasks assigned.   
African peace operations are led by one of several common organizing agency 
models.  The UN has led the largest number of missions with 33 missions in the study 
group.  The AU/OAU is the next most common organizing agency with 21 missions.  
Non-African international organizations such as the EU and the Commonwealth of 
Nations have led 10 missions.  African regional economic communities have led nine 
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missions.  Individual sovereign countries have led nine missions.  Ad hoc coalitions have 
led four missions.   
UN operations are those authorized by the UN Security Council, implemented 
under the supervision of the UN Secretary General, and with senior leaders who function 
as UN civil service employees.  These missions enjoy UN support structures such as 
DPKO institutional support including standardized doctrine, supply procurement, and 
field support.  Since 2005 the UN Peacebuilding Commission has also aided missions by 
serving as an advisory body to UN missions (Diehl & Balas, 2014).     
AU, OAU prior to 2002, operations are those authorized, constructed, and 
implemented under the auspices of either the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution or the AU Peace and Security Council.  The OAU missions 
remained mostly small observation missions.  The Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
included two bodies; the Military Staff Committee and the Commissioner in Charge of 
Peace and Security.  These two bodies have increased the AU’s capacity for supporting 
more robust operations.  AU missions since 2003 have had the support of these bodies 
and have reported to the Chairperson of the PSC (Diehl & Balas, 2014).            
Missions led by non-African international organizations have included the EU and 
the Commonwealth of Nations.  Both groups have focused on smaller supporting 
missions with a narrow focus in support of a larger UN or AU mission.  The 
Commonwealth of Nations missions have been authorized and managed by the Royal 
Commonwealth Society on an ad hoc basis (Royal Commonwealth Society, 2016).  The 
EU missions relied on a more established support infrastructure supported by the EU 
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Peace and Security Committee that was responsible for mission support and management.  
Non-African international organizations led missions focused on niche support of larger 
missions.  
Regional economic communities have been the intervenor of last resort.  
ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD, SADC, and others have intervened when others would not 
(Balas, 2011).  Their focus has been on peace enforcement missions into active conflicts.  
Missions in Sierra Leone (ECOMOG-SL), Liberia (ECOMOG-L), and the Central 
African Republic (MICOPAX and FOMUC) have fallen into this pattern.  The 
organizations lack established support structures and function on an ad hoc basis.  They 
frequently have deployed peace enforcement operations due to the consensus-based (no 
requirement of unanimity) decision making of their organizations (Diehl & Balas, 2014).   
Individual sovereign nations and ad hoc coalitions have led relevant peace 
operations on 14 occasions.  In each instance these interventions have relied on the 
endemic capacities of the nations that acted.  The majority of these have received UN 
security council authorization and have served to bolster either a UN, AU, or regional 
economic community mission in need.  Their mandates have either been to enforce peace 
so that an established mission may focus on its peacekeeping or peacebuilding mandate 
or to fulfill a niche mission set in support of a larger mission.  These niche peacebuilding 
activities enable nations to contribute to the success of a mission without placing their 
forces under the command of the said mission (Williams, 2016).     
Troop capacity is the essential link between what the mission aspires to do, the 
mandate, and what the mission does, the output.  Logic dictates that a mandate will fail if 
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the force charged with implementation has neither the requisite expertise nor tools at its 
disposal.  The examples of this have been many in peace operation history.  MINUSCA’s 
undertrained and poorly equipped forces have been unable to achieve mandated 
protection of civilians task (Amnesty International, 2016).  ONUMOZ struggled to 
deploy its forces to rural Mozambique not due to a lack of equipment, but due to a 
shortage of trained drivers (Jett, 1999).      
Hass and Ansorg’s study (2018) demonstrated the success of mandate execution 
was dependent on quality of forces not quantity.  Specifically, they found that troop 
quality and capacity were directly linked to the successful protection of civilians and 
other tasks associated with more robust mandates.  Their study explained the mismatch 
between larger forces that have failed and smaller forces that have succeeded.  Haass and 
Ansorg found causation to be a combination of better training, more equipment, and 
higher levels of political support (2018).   
I adopted Haass and Ansorg’s measure of a troop contributing country’s (TCC) 
military expenditure per number of armed personnel (spending per capita) to assess the 
capacity of peace operations soldiers.  The troop spending per capita figures were created 
by dividing a nation’s total military expenditure by total number of military personnel.  
The calculation was based upon on numbers from the year a mission was initiated and 
measured in constant 2016 USD.  This formula provided a quantifiable proxy measure of 
assumed military capacity.  The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database (2018) provided the military spending numbers.  
The Military Balance annual publication by the International Institute for Strategic 
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Studies (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990-2015) provided the number of 
armed service members for each country.      
This proxy is an imperfect measure.  Spending per capita is an input.  A forces’ 
ability to take actions in support of a mission is the true output.  However, expenditures 
are widely accepted as a measure of military capability (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).  The 
formula is the best available measure as it encapsulates both the equipment a military 
possesses as well as the training of its military forces.  Higher spending per soldier 
equates better equipment and training (Haass & Ansorg, 2018).   
Post-Cold War frequently employed assistance programs to augment the training, 
equipping, and sustainment of peace operation forces.  It was therefore necessary to 
examine the impact of these programs on the capability of forces to conduct mandated 
tasks in pursuit of a successful peace operation.  The presence of African Contingency 
Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program or African Crisis Response Initiative 
(ACRI) trained forces and African Peace Facility (APF) mission support were examined 
as additional independent variables.  These programs affected the same capability factors 
Haass and Ansorg identified as affecting success.  These programs support to training, 
equipping, and sustaining peace operations forces has been key to force development in 
support of African peace operations (Varhola & Varhola, 2011).       
Table 3.4 below consolidated the factors that impact the peace operation force 
capacity.  The variables have been categorized into those dealing with a mission’s lead 
organization; the quantity and origin of its troops; and the capacity of those troops.  These 
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variables were essential to test linkages between intervenor and mandate in my basic 
theory of peace operations. 






Lead Organization  UN 
 AU/OAU 
 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
 Individual Countries or Ad hoc Coalitions 
Personnel  Intervenor force composition   
 Number of countries represented   
 Country representation and proportion of total force 
Resources  Troop contributing country military expenditure per armed force 
member 
 Training & equipment support from major power?  yes/no.   
 Primary major power supporter (UK, US, France, etc) 
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International 
Peace Institute (2018); World Bank (2018); SIPRI (2018); IISS (1990-2015); Williams (2016). 
 
 
Peace Operations Outcomes.  Scholarly works of peace operations have too often 
delved into the reasons why an operation succeeded or failed without first defining how 
the assessment was reached (Diehl & Balas, 2014).  Terms such as success or failure 
have little value unless specifically defined.  I have defined success by means of a two-
part question.  First, was either peace established, or the mission transferred?  Second, if 
established was peace resilient for five years?  Resilient peace was defined as the absence 
of either war or another deployed peace operation during the five-year period.  Potential 
outcomes were complete success, partial success, or failure.  Complete success was 
defined as peace established and resilient in excess of five years.  Partial success was 
defined as either peace established and lasted less than five years or mission transferred 
to another peace operation.  Failure was defined as a mission withdrawing during a time 
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of war or transferring after a new war erupted.  For example, UNAMIR I was coded as a 
failure despite it transferring to UNAMIR II which would be coded a partial success.  
UNAMIR I was a failure due to the Second Rwandan War beginning during its 
deployment.  UNAMIR II deployed during the Second Rwandan War, and closed after 
the establishment of a peace that lasted less than five years.  I utilized the decision 
template developed by Diehl and Druckman (2015) and elaborated by Peter (2016) to 
produce this definition.  The section below explains selection criteria and defines specific 
terminology used in the research analysis. 
The peace operation success decision template was designed to assist in the 
scoping of studies.  Diehl and Druckman’s template had three questions to be asked 
during study design.  These questions were: who are the stakeholders, what is the time 
perspective, and what is the assessment standard.  Peter added, what is the type of peace 
operation, to the template.  My definition was created via this template.  A discussion of 
the four questions below demonstrates the logic chain that produced my definition.     
“Success for whom?” was the framework’s first question.  I chose success for the 
international community who supports the peace operation.  All peace operations seek to 
ameliorate conflict conditions and ultimately to end the conflict (Diehl & Balas, 2014).  
Therefore, it is a logical position for a quantitative study of peace operations to analyze 
whether the investment, the operation, produced the desired outcome, the absence of war.  
This response may not be adequately concise for a detailed case study nor a comparative 
analysis that sought more causation and less correlation.   
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The selection of a short-term or long-term time frame is the second question.  I 
assessed the resilience of peace at the five-year post intervention closure date.  Peace was 
considered resilient there has been no further armed peace operations nor named conflicts 
per the Correlates of War standard at the five-year mark.  The peace was considered not 
to be resilient if these standards were not met.  For example, the ECOMICI peace 
keeping mission in Cote d’Ivoire was not coded as producing a resilient peace as both the 
peace keeping Operation Licorne and the peacebuilding ONUCI missions would be 
present for more than 10 years after the end of ECOMICI.  
The selection of five-years was made to ensure sufficient time had lapsed to 
demonstrate the resilience of peace.  A return to conflict post withdrawal demonstrates 
that the mission, while successful at halting violence, was unsuccessful in the 
superordinate goal.  Timeframes for similar studies range from two to ten years (Diehl & 
Druckman, 2015).  Selection on the lower end of the model is advantageous for policy 
makers who seek a rapid response and fidelity that the mission was responsible for the 
conditions at time of assessment.  As time duration increases the conditions on the 
ground are influenced by an increasing number of factors that were not present at the 
time of mission completion.  However, a longer duration reduces the impact of short-term 
trend and increases fidelity on the resilience of conditions created by the mission. 
The framework’s third point is definition of the baseline from which success is 
measured.  My selection was to establish the baseline for success as no further armed 
peace interventions nor named conflicts per the Correlates of War project at the time of 
evaluation.  This selection sought to avoid three traps associated with similar academic 
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studies.  The postulating of counterfactual analysis requires the creation of an alternative 
reality in which no action is taken.  The reality is that there are other options such as 
sanctions and diplomacy available to the international community.  I have also sought to 
avoid the minimalist definition of any improvement.  A well planned and resourced peace 
operation should be expected to produce something greater “one death fewer per annum”.  
The third trap is to compare the situation after the mission to the situation at the time of 
deployment.  This creates a selection bias where missions appear to be more or less 
successful depending on if they deployed to an area during active conflict or during a 
ceasefire (Peter, 2016).  My baseline was designed to provide feedback to my 
stakeholders, the international community, on the success or failure of their superordinate 
goal, the establishment of resilient peace.       
The fourth question, what to include in the population of peace operations, is 
designed to maximize the comparison of like and like operations.  Most studies have 
focused on either one category of operation or kept missions segregated into categories 
for comparative reasons.  My study has fallen under the latter category.  I have included 
all operations meeting the following definition: the deployment of police and/or military 
forces to assist in the prevention or cessation of armed conflict by serving to observe or 
assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; enforcement of ceasefires 
or peace agreements; or to build a stable peace (Williams, 2013).  I segregated these 
missions based on mandates categories of monitor, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
and peacebuilding.  These categories facilitated both the comparison of like with like 
missions and the evaluation of outcome trends by mission type.    
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My answers to the framework’s questions produced a definition of success that 
enabled comparison among and between the 86 missions identified in the study.  The 
question of success identifies output and impact resulting in the three potential answers; 
complete success, partial success, or failure.  
My definition of success was similar to many other studies that asked what was 
the output, peace or no peace, and the impact, resilient peace.  These included the works 
of Fortna (2008) and Fiedler (2000).  My output varied slight from the others in that I 
incorporated mission transfer into the structure.  The three potential outputs identified 
whether the mission was successful and to what degree.  See Table 3.5 below for the 
measurements of success, the dependent variable. 






Peace at mission end 
 
yes or no 
Mission transfer  
 
yes or no 
Outbreak of war during deployment 
 
yes or no 
Peace maintained 5 years 
 
yes or no 
 
The potential outputs based on this model are as follows: 
 Complete Mission Success: Peace was established prior to mission 
departure, and peace was resilient for a period of five-years.  
 Partial Mission Success: Peace was established prior to mission 
departure or mission responsibilities transferred to another 
operation.  Any peace established was not resilient to the five-year 
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mark as indicated by the deployment of another peace operation or 
the outbreak of a named war.  
 Mission Failure: Peace was not established and mission withdrew; 
or mission transferred after a new war began.  
This measurement of success indicates if a mission resolved a conflict, produced 
some positives outcomes, or failed.  Failure indicates the intervenor was unable to 
establish peace and withdrew.  Missions which failed to prevent the onset of a new war 
and then transferred are also determined to be failures.  Partial Success correlates a 
failure of the mandate to fully address the underlying root causes of conflict.  Any peace 
established by a partially successful mission proved resilient for less than five years as 
indicated by the eruption of a named war or the deployment of a subsequent peace 
operation.  A partially successful mission may have also produced some positive 
outcomes before transferring to another operation.  Complete success indicated that the 
operation was capable of producing peace and that the mission addressed the conflict 
conditions sufficiently to make that peace resilient.     
Mission Completion Terms: Transition and Close.  These are not used in the same 
construct as utilized in the 2008 UN Capstone project.  In the UN Capstone the term 
transition refers to the end of military involvement and the transition to a wholly civilian 
mission set under a new name and structure.  This study is focused on interventions with 
a military aspect.  As such, the terms are utilized in a manner germane to the study’s 
purpose.   
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Transfer or transition refers to a mission whose responsibilities are transferred 
from one to another named mission.  These missions may be led by different 
organizations; may or utilize the same personnel; and may add or subtract from the 
mandated responsibilities.  Peace operations focused on the Darfur Rebellion are a 
seminal example of transition.  The response to Darfur began with an AU led observation 
mission, transitioned to an AU led peacekeeping mission, and then transitioned to a 
hybrid AU/UN led mission.  The transition from observation to peacekeeping maintained 
the same leadership but changed the mandate and the personnel.  The second transition 
maintained the same personnel but changed leadership.        
 Close refers to a mission whose end does not coincide with a transfer of 
responsibility to another mission involving military personnel.  Often times, these 
missions do not close all offices, but change into a solely civilian mission focused on 
providing assistance to local authorities and continuing the peace building actions of a 
mission.  However, these civilian missions do not include a military element and conduct 
operations on a level below those specifically defined as peace operations. 
Summary 
This chapter examined the variables connected to conflict characteristics, mandate 
type, and intervenor capacity as well as their impacts on the chain of success or failure 
connecting these independent variables with the dependent variable.  My study examined 
all peace operations in post-Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa.  Information began with 
Williams’ (2016) list of peace operations and was augmented by the conflict and 
intervention descriptions in Chapter 2.  Variables that affected the success or failure of 
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peace operations were identified from previous studies discussed in Chapter 1 and 
elaborated on in this chapter.  These variables were categorized into those that pertained 
to the conflict, the mandate, and the intervening force.   
This chapter explained these variables and their impacts.  Numerous conflict 
related variables were found to increase or decrease the likelihood of a successful 
intervention.  Qualitative analysis of conflicts is concluded in Chapter 4 and categorizes 
conflicts based on the presence or absence of these variables.  Also discussed were 
mandate variables that delineate operations as being either a peace monitoring, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacebuilding mission type.  Finally, those 
variables that impact force capacity including the construction of a proxy figure were 
discussed.  These variables have been shown to measure the ability of an implementing 
force to accomplish its mandated tasks.  These independent variables all influence the               
The following chapter tests my nine hypotheses to examine the peace operations 
discussed in Chapter 2 by means of the variables presented in this chapter.  This 
hypothesis testing provides answers on the relationships between and outputs produced 









CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This chapter examines each of the hypotheses listed at the beginning of the 
Methodology chapter, in order to test the basic theory of peace operations outlined in 
Figure 1.1. in the Introductory chapter.  The logic of this theory is that the conflict 
conditions existing in an African country will be addressed by the peace operations 
mandate to be carried out by military forces charged to achieve conflict settlement 
conditions that ameliorate violence and establish and enforce a sustaining peace 
agreement.      
Peace Operations Data 
The data descriptions in Chapter 2 provided the basic information on variables 
listed in the Methodology chapter, augmented by Williams’ (2016) list of 83 African 
peace operations that occurred between 1990 and 2015 (including mission name, 
location, dates, and deployed size) plus three additional peace operations not included in 
Williams’ list, for a total of 86 cases.  I expanded Williams’ data to incorporate these 
three additional cases to incorporate one recent mission and two that met my peace 
operation criteria, but did not appear on his list.  The French operations Turquoise was 
included in my list as it received UN authorization and deployed into a Sub-Saharan 
country during the relevant timeframe.  Williams’ did not provide a reason for not 
including Operation Turquoise, but may have omitted the operations due to the debate as 
to if France’s goal was in line with the UN mandate (Conroy, 2018).  Operation Barkhane 
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was the successor mission to Operation Serval and was included to update Williams’ list.  
I counted AMIS 1 and AMIS 2 as separate missions to accommodate for the change in 
mandate and force structure brought by the transition.  Considering AMIS as two separate 
missions is also in line with the official position of the EU and others (Janos, 2009).  
Williams himself included the EU Support to AMIS 2 mission in his list but did not 
differentiate AMIS 2 as a separate mission from AMIS 1.  Table 4.1 shows basic 
information about each mission, organized alphabetically by country of deployment, and 
the mission outcome using the measures described in the Methodology chapter.    
 
















Angola MON UN UNAVEM I 1/3/1989 6/6/1991 Partial Success 
 PKO UN UNAVEM II 5/1/1991 2/1/1995 Failure 
 PKO UN UNAVEM 
III 
2/1/1995 6/1/1997 Partial Success 
 
 
PKO UN MONUA 6/1/1997 3/20/1999 Failure 
Burundi MON OAU OMIB 12/7/1993 7/31/1996 Failure 
 PKO AU SAPSD**** 10/27/2001 8/8/2009 Complete 
Success 
 PKO AU AMIB 2/12/2003 5/20/2004 Partial Success  
 PBO+ 
 
UN ONUB 5/21/2004 12/31/2006 Complete 
Success  
CAR PEO Inter-African 
Force 
MISAB 2/1/1997 4/1/1998 Partial Success 
 PBO+ UN MINURCA 4/1/1998 2/1/2000 Partial Success 
 PEO CEN-SAD  CEN-SAD 2/1/2002 12/28/2002 Partial Success 
 PEO CEMAC FOMUC 10/1/2002 7/1/2008 Partial Success 
 PEO ECCAS MICOPAX 6/20/2008 12/19/2013 Failure 
 PEO France Operation 
Sangaris** 
12/5/2013 10/31/2016 Partial Success 
 PKO AU MISCA 12/19/2013 9/15/2014 Partial Success 
 PKO EU EUFOR 
RCA**  
9/15/2014 3/15/2015 Partial Success 
 
 
PBO+ UN MINUSCA 9/15/2014 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
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Chad MON UN UNASOG 5/1/1994 6/1/1994 Complete 
Success  









1/28/2008 3/15/2009 Complete 
Success  
Comoros MON OAU OMIC 11/25/1997 5/30/1999 Failure 
 MON AU OMIC 2 11/27/2001 2/2/2002 Partial Success 
 MON AU OMIC 3 3/15/2002 5/15/2002 Partial Success 
 MON AU MIOC / 
OMIC4 
3/9/2004 5/9/2004 Partial Success 
 MON AU AMISEC 3/21/2006 6/9/2006 Partial Success 








3/25/2008 4/30/2008 Complete 
Success  
Cote d'Ivoire PEO France Operation 
Licorne** 
9/22/2002 1/21/2015 Partial 
Success*** 
 PKO ECOWAS ECOMICI 10/1/2002 4/4/2004 Partial Success  
 MON UN MINUCI 5/13/2003 4/4/2004 Partial Success  
 
 
PBO+ UN ONUCI 4/4/2004 6/30/2017 Partial 
Success*** 
DRC MON OAU OAU 
Observer 
Mission 
11/16/1999 11/30/2000 Partial Success 
 PKO UN MONUC-a 11/30/1999 1/1/2002 Partial Success 
 PBO+ UN MONUC-b 1/1/2002 6/30/2010 Partial Success 
 PEO EU  Operation 
Artemis** 
6/1/2003 9/1/2003 Partial Success 
 PBO EU EUSEC-
CONGO** 
1/1/2005 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
 PBO EU EUFOR-
RD** 
4/25/2006 9/1/2006 Partial Success 
 
 
PBO+ UN  MONUSCO 7/1/2010 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
Ethiopia and 
Eritrea 
MON AU OLMEE, 
AULMEE** 










12/26/1998 6/7/1999 Complete 
Success  
 PBO EU EU SSR 2/12/2008 9/30/2010 Failure 
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 PBO Anglola MISSANG-
GB 
3/21/2011 6/9/2012 Failure 
 
 
PKO ECOWAS ECOMIB 5/16/2012 6/30/2017 Ongoing  
Lake Chad 
Basin 
PEO MNJTF+Benin MNJTF vs 
Boko Haram 
 
10/7/2014 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
Liberia PEO ECOWAS  ECOMOG-L 8/24/1990 2/2/1998 Partial Success 
 MON UN  UNOMIL** 9/1/1993 9/1/1997 Partial Success 
 PKO ECOWAS ECOMIL 8/4/2003 9/30/2003 Partial Success  
 PEO US JTF 
Liberia** 
8/14/2003 9/30/2003 Partial Success  
 
 
PBO+ UN UNMIL 10/1/2003 3/30/2018 Partial 
Success***  
Mali PEO AU/ECOWAS AFISMA 12/20/2012 4/1/2013 Partial Success 
 PEO France Operation 
Serval** 
1/11/2013 7/15/2014 Partial Success 
 PBO EU EUTM 
Mali** 
2/1/2013 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
 PBO+ UN MINUSMA 4/25/2013 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
Mali and 
others 
PEO France Operation 
Barkhane** 
 
8/1/2014 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
Mozambique MON Eight Allied 
Nations 
JVC 12/1/1990 10/1/1992 Partial Success  
 
 




PBO UN UNTAG 4/1/1989 3/1/1990 Complete 
Success  
Rwanda MON OAU OAU MOT 4/1/1991 9/1/1991 Partial Success 
 MON OAU OAU 
NMOG I 
9/1/1991 7/1/1992 Partial Success 
 MON OAU OAU 
NMOG II 
8/1/1992 11/1/1993 Partial Success 
 PKO UN UNAMIR I 10/1/1993 5/17/1994 Failure 
 PBO+ UN UNAMIR II 5/18/1994 3/1/1996 Partial Success 
 PEO France Operation 
Turquoise** 




MON UN UNOMUR 6/1/1993 9/1/1994 Failure 
Sierra Leone PEO ECOWAS ECOMOG-
SL 
6/1/1997 5/2/2000 Failure 
 MON UN UNOMSIL 7/13/1998 10/21/1999 Partial Success  




 PEO UK Palliser** 5/1/2000 6/15/2000 Complete 
Success  
 PBO+ UK Basilica and 
Silkman** 
 
6/16/2000 1/1/2005 Complete 
Success  
Somalia PKO UN  UNOSOM I  4/1/1992 3/1/1993 Partial Success 
 PEO Coalition of 20 
nations 
UNITAF** 12/1/1992 3/1/1993 Partial Success 
 PBO+ UN UNOSOM II 3/1/1993 3/1/1995 Failure 




PBO EU EUTM 
Somalia** 
4/10/2010 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
South Africa PBO Commonwealth 
of Nations 
 




PBO+ UN UNMISS 6/9/2011 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
Sudan MON UN JMC and 
IMU 
4/4/2002 6/20/2005 Partial Success 
 MON AU AMIS 1 5/1/2004 10/1/2004 Partial Success 
 PKO AU AMIS 2 10/1/2004 1/1/2008 Partial Success 
 PBO+ UN UNMIS 3/24/2005 7/9/2011 Partial Success 
 PKO EU EU Support 
to AMIS 2** 
7/18/2005 12/31/2007 Partial Success 
 PBO+ UN/AU Joint UNAMID 7/31/2007 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
 
 
PKO UN UNISFA 6/27/2011 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
Western 
Sahara 
MON OAU OAU 
Mission to 
W. Sahara 
1/1/1991 4/1/1991 Partial Success 
 PKO 
 
UN MINURSO 4/1/1991 3/30/2019 Ongoing 
* Complete mission success: mandate tasks completed, peace established by mission departure, lasted at 
least 5 years; Partial mission success: mandate tasks completed, peace established but short-lived; 
Mission failure: mandate tasks not completed, peace not established. Unknown: mandate tasks 
completed, peace established, less than 5 years passed since mission closure. 
** Parallel supporting mission.  A mission deployed to complement another peace operation (e.g. EU 
Support to AMIS 2 provided planning, technical assistance, and troop training in support of AMIS 2). 
*** Successful mission where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace 
criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research. 
**** SAPSD stand-alone, then parallel, then standalone mission. 
+ Peacebuilding Operation with UN Chapter VII deterrence authorized in mandate. 




The following paragraphs present initial observations from the data in Table 4.1.  
My study identified 86 peace operations deployed to 23 countries or contiguous regions 
in response to 33 periods of conflict.  These missions were dispersed between lead 
organizations with 33 UN led, 21 AU led, nine regional economic community led, and 23 
“Other” missions that were atypically organized and led.  These missions were spread 
between mandates with 21 peace monitoring, 20 peacekeeping, 19 peace enforcement, 
and 26 peacebuilding missions.  Results were mixed with 16 mission completely 
successful, 44 missions partially successful, 12 failed missions, and 14 missions either 
ongoing or recently concluded.   
Mission duration showed a slight correlation between longer missions and 
success.  It also highlighted the trend towards longer missions.  The average mission 
duration was 943 days (about 2.5 years).  The shortest mission, Operation Turquoise, 
lasted a mere 30 days while the longest mission, UNMIL, lasted 5,294 days (about 14.5 
years).  Missions that were completely successful averaged 979 (about 2.7 years); those 
that were partial successful 696 days (about 1.9 years); and failed missions averaged 709 
(almost 2 years).  The most significant statistic was that those successfully completed in 
the past five years averaged 4,878 days (over 13 years) and those ongoing would have 
averaged 3,536 days (about 9.7 years) if they were simultaneously completed on April 
20, 2019 (the cutoff date for this research).  Longer duration missions were loosely 
associated with resilient peace outputs and more recent missions have been much longer 
than average.   
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UN led missions were the plurality composing 33 of the 86 missions analyzed.  
The UN led missions across the spectrum of mandates including seven peace monitoring, 
eight peacekeeping, three peace enforcement, and 15 peacebuilding missions.  UN 
missions were successful 21 times; with seven completely successful and 14 partially 
successful.  Five UN missions ended in complete failure and seven are ongoing.  UN 
missions that have closed were on average deployed for 1,345 days (about 3.7 years); 
significantly longer than average.            
The African Union (AU or OAU) led 21 missions.  These missions included 13 
peace monitoring, five peacekeeping, and three peace enforcing missions.  Outcomes 
were generally positive with four complete successes, 14 partial successes, two failures, 
and one mission, AMISOM, ongoing.  AU missions that have closed were on average 
deployed for 584 days (1.6 years); significantly shorter than average.          
Regional economic communities have led nine peace operations in my study.  
These missions were split between four peacekeeping and five peace building missions.  
Outcomes were mixed with one complete success, five partial successes, two failures, 
and one ongoing.  Regional Economic Community led missions that have closed were on 
average deployed for 1,124 days (just over three years); slightly longer than average. 
23 peace operations were otherwise organized, i.e. they were not led by the four 
key players I identified.  These operations were divided across the spectrum of missions 
with one peace monitoring mission, three peacekeeping missions, 11 peace enforcement 
missions, and eight peacebuilding missions.  Outcomes were mixed with five complete 
successes, 10 partial successes, three failures, and five missions ongoing.  These missions 
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that have closed were on average deployed for 681 days (about 1.8 years); significantly 
shorter than average. 
Peace monitoring missions were relatively successful with 18 of 21 missions rated 
successful.  However, there were only two instances, OLMEE and UNASOG, of a 
resilient peace being established after the closure of a monitoring mission.  The 16 other 
occasions were rated as partially successful.  On five occasions either a new conflict or 
the deployment of another peace operation occurred within five years of mission closure.  
In 11 occasions the mission transferred to peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission. 
A majority, 13, of peace monitoring missions were led by the AU.  The UN led 
seven and one, JVC Mozambique, was led by an ad hoc coalition.  As previously stated 
11 missions transferred to larger missions.  Five of the 13 AU missions transitioned to 
UN missions.  Many peace monitoring missions served as a trip-wire to larger 
internationalized responses to African conflicts.     
Peacekeeping missions were completely successful five times, partially successful 
10 times, twice resulted in failure, and three missions are ongoing.  These positive 
outcomes are not surprising given most major studies have determined the two 
prerequisites for peacekeeping, an existing cease-fire and belligerent consent, are 
prerequisites for peace operations success in general (Fortna, 2008; Diehl, 1994; Heldt, 
2001; Greig & Diehl, 2005; Fiedler, 2000).   
Peacekeeping missions were led by a variety of intervening forces.  UN forces led 
eight, the AU led five, regional economic communities led four and the EU led three.  All 
non-UN led missions were either a partial or complete success with one currently 
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undetermined.  The UN had a mixed outcome with two complete failures (UNAMIR I 
and MONUA), three partial successes (UNOSOM I, UNAVEM III, and MONUC-a), and 
two complete successes (UNMEE and ONUB).         
The figures for peace enforcement confirm Fortna’s assessment that enforcement 
missions were likely stop fighting but unlikely to produce resilient peace (2003).  Peace 
enforcement operations produced a complete success only twice and then only when 
deployed as a parallel supporting mission.  They were partially successful 11 times, a 
failure on three occasions, and three missions are ongoing.  Regional economic 
communities led the majority of completed peace enforcement missions including the 
two of three failures, MICOPAX and ECOMOG-SL.   
Peacebuilding operations were relatively successful with seven complete 
successes and seven partial successes.  Additionally, two of the partial successes may yet 
prove resilient when the five-year post closure date is reached for ONUCI and UNMIL.  
Four peacebuilding missions failed and eight are ongoing.  The UN led the majority of 
peacebuilding missions.  They were partially successful in four of eleven missions and 
completely successful in five of eleven.  Two of the non-UN missions in this data set 
were complete failures.  EU SSR and MISSANG-GB were both small scale operations 
with limited objectives and even more limited means.  They were withdrawn when failure 
appeared inevitable.     
The information provided in Table 4.1 demonstrated the variety of operations by 
outcome, mandate, duration, and lead agency.  The hypotheses testing elaborated on these 
cursory observations by examining the conflict itself, the mandates, the intervening force 
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capacity, and the relationships to other peace operations.  The examination of these 
elements identified patterns that were more likely to produce desirable outcomes.  These 
conclusions are listed by hypothesis in the following section with a summarization 
following the hypotheses.   
Hypothesis Testing 
My hypotheses focus on the relationships between various elements of a peace 
operation.  The first hypothesis examines the relationship between the conflict 
characteristics and the peace operation mandate.  The second hypothesis examines the 
relationship between the mandate and the force capability sent to implement that 
mandate.  The third and fourth hypothesis examines the effect of intervening force 
capacity on mission outcome.  The final five hypotheses look at specific issues that may 
impact the effectiveness of an operation.   
The analysis for each section relied on 66 of the identified 86 peace operations.    
The outcomes of 20 parallel supporting operations were not included in the results.  
These missions were factored as an independent variable affecting the outcome of the 
missions they supported.  Counting the outcome of these parallel operations would have 
double count their impact.  14 included missions were ongoing at the time of this study.  
A further seven had not passed the five-years post-mission closure point required for 
assessment of impact.  Four of these missions (Operation Sangaris, EUFOR RCA, MISA, 
and Operation Serval) were partially successful, but did not produce a resilient peace.  
Three of these missions (ONUCI, UNMIL, and Operation Licorne) were counted as 
partially successful, but may transition to completely successful at a later date. In 
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summation, missions included in calculations were those deployed to directly address the 
conflict, not to augment an existing mission addressing the conflict, and include ongoing 
as well as recently closed operations. 
Hypothesis 1: The Conflict Characteristics determine the peace operation 
mandate.  The data in Table 4.2 displayed the level of conflict complexity, type of peace 
operation, and the mission outcome.  The relationship between complex conflicts and 
robust peace operations was demonstrated by which mandate types have been deployed 
to specific conflicts.  Conflicts were qualitatively assessed into each category based on 
the variables identified in Table 3.1 and categorized into categories of high, medium, or 
low complexity.  The variables from Table 3.1 were those identified as having the 
greatest impact on making a conflict resilient to peace and reducing the likelihood of 
intervention success in previous studies by Fortna (2004, 2008), Doyal and Sabanis 
(2006), Fiedler (2000), Diehl and Balas (2014), and Walter (2010).  The most significant 
of these variables were the presence of an intra-state war with external support to the 
rebels (Williams, 2016) and the absence of a cease-fire or peace agreement signed by all 
belligerent groups (Fortna, 2008).     
Highly complex conflicts are those that exhibit all or most of the features found to 
increase the likelihood of conflict reoccurrence and minimize the likelihood of 
interventions success. Africa’s World War was the most complex conflict analyzed.  It 
had greater than three belligerent groups, more than 100,000 individuals under arms, 
external support to rebel forces, readily lootable resources to fund the conflict, high 
annual deaths due to violence, no cease-fire agreed to by all parties to the conflict, and a 
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low local capacity.  All these factors add to the challenge of peace operation intervention 
and lessen the ease of successfully establishing a resilient peace.  Unfortunately, these 
ingredients have been common to post-Cold War conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
A medium complexity conflict presents serious challenges to a peace operation, 
but at a lesser level than a highly complex conflict.  These conflicts possess some, but not 
all of the variables that diminish the likelihood of a successful peace operation outcome.  
They possess some mitigating factors such as a peace agreement, only two belligerent 
groups, or a highly developed economy.  The Burundian conflicts were examples of 
medium complex conflicts.  The conflicts were intrastate wars with moderate levels of 
violence and low local capacity.  External support to rebels was limited, there were no 
readily lootable resources, and ceasefire agreements were in place prior to mission 
deployment. 
Low complexity conflicts are those that do not present serious barriers to peace 
operation intervention.  These conflicts were frequently interstate conflicts with a 
ceasefire or peace agreement in place.  The South African Border was in Namibia was 
one such conflict.  Namibia’s long duration of conflict and intrastate fight with external 
support were mitigated by the presence of a peace agreement and low levels of violence.  
In another example, the Badme Border War was a long and bloody war but was an 
interstate conflict with an existent cease-fire at the time of intervention.  Low complexity 

















High Complexity (N = 8 Countries; N = 38 Peace Operations) 
 
Angola Angolan Control 
War 
UNAVEM I MON Partial Success 
     
CAR Intrastate Conflict CEN-SAD PEO Partial Success 
 FOMUC PEO Partial Success 
 MICOPAX PEO Failure 
 
 
CAR War Operation 
Sangaris** 
PEO Partial Success 
 MISCA PKO Partial Success 
 EUFOR RCA**  PKO Partial Success 
 MINUSCA PBO+ Ongoing 
     




MON Partial Success 
 MONUC-a PKO Partial Success 
 MONUC-b PBO+ Partial Success 
 Operation 
Artemis** 




 EUFOR-RD** PBO Partial Success 
 MONUSCO PBO+ Ongoing 
     
Liberia 1st and 2nd Liberia 
Wars 
ECOMOG-L PEO Partial Success 
 2nd Liberia War UNOMIL** MON Partial Success 
 Liberia-LURD 
War 
ECOMIL PKO Partial Success  
 JTF Liberia** PEO Partial Success  
 
 
UNMIL PBO+ Partial Success***  
     
Sierra Leone First Sierra Leone 
War 
ECOMOG-SL PEO Failure 
 Second Sierra 
Leone War 
UNOMSIL MON Partial Success  
 UNAMSIL PBO+ Complete Success  
 Palliser** PEO Complete Success  
 Basilica and 
Silkman** 
PBO+ Complete Success  
     
Somalia 2nd Somali War UNOSOM I  PKO Partial Success 
 UNITAF** PEO Partial Success 
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 UNOSOM II PBO+ Failure 









UNMISS PBO+ Ongoing 
     
Sudan Darfur Rebellion JMC and IMU MON Partial Success 
 AMIS 1 MON Partial Success 
 AMIS 2 PKO Partial Success 
  EU Support to 
AMIS 2** 
PKO Partial Success 
  UNAMID PBO+ Ongoing 
 2nd South Sudan 
War 
UNMIS PBO+ Partial Success 
 UNISFA PKO Ongoing 
 
Medium Complexity (N = 9 Countries; N = 30 Peace Operations) 
 
Angola Angolan War of 
the Cities 
UNAVEM II PKO Failure 
 UNAVEM III PKO Partial Success 
 
 
MONUA PKO Failure 
Burundi Second Burundi 
War 
OMIB MON Failure 
 Third Burundi War SAPSD**** PKO Complete Success 
 AMIB PKO Partial Success  
 ONUB PBO+ 
 
Complete Success  
CAR Intrastate Conflict  MISAB PEO Partial Success 
 MINURCA PBO+ Partial Success 
     
Chad Chad-United 
Opposition War 
MINURCAT PBO Complete Success  
 
 
EUFOR-Chad** PKO Complete Success  
     




PEO Partial Success*** 
  ECOMICI PKO Partial Success  
  MINUCI MON Partial Success  
  ONUCI PBO+ Partial Success***  
     
Lake Chad 
Basin 
Boko Haram War MNJTF 
 
PEO Ongoing 
     







PEO Partial Success 
 EUTM Mali** PBO Ongoing 




     
Mozambique Mozambique War JVC MON Partial Success  
 ONUMOZ PBO Complete Success  
     
Rwanda Intrastate Conflict OAU MOT MON Partial Success 
 OAU NMOG I MON Partial Success 
 OAU NMOG II MON Partial Success 
  UNOMUR MON Failure 
  UNAMIR I PKO Failure 





Low Complexity (N = 7 Countries; N = 18 Peace Operations) 
 
Chad Azouzou Strip 
War 
UNASOG MON Complete Success  
     
Comoros Intrastate Conflict OMIC MON Failure 
 OMIC 2 MON Partial Success 
 OMIC 3 MON Partial Success 
 MIOC / OMIC4 MON Partial Success 
 AMISEC MON Partial Success 
 MAES PKO Complete Success  
 
 
Democracy in the 
Comoros** 
PEO Complete Success  







MON Complete Success  
  UNMEE PKO Complete Success  
     
Guinea-Bissau GB Military War ECOMOG-GB PKO Complete Success  
 Intrastate Conflict EU SSR PBO Failure 
  MISSANG-GB PBO Failure 
  ECOMIB PKO Ongoing  





UNTAG PBO Complete Success  
     
South Africa Inkatha-ANC War CPAG-SA PBO Complete Success  
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OAU Mission to 
W. Sahara 
MON Partial Success 
 MINURSO PKO Ongoing 
     
* Conflict names and durations from Sakees and Wayman (2010), and Dixon and Sarkees (2016).  
“Intrastate conflict” label denotes period of less than war violence. 
** Parallel supporting mission.  A mission deployed to complement another peace operation.  
*** Successful mission where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace 
criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.  
**** SAPSD stand-alone, then parallel, then standalone mission. 
+ Peacebuilding Operation with UN Chapter VII deterrence authorized in mandate. 
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); Williams (2016). 
 
The analysis indicated a strong correlation between mission type and conflict 
complexity.  The more complex a conflict the more likely was the deployment of a 
peacebuilding mission.  This correlation was especially drastic when looking at robust 
peacebuilding missions.  Peace enforcement deployment displayed a similar array 
favoring more complex conflicts.  Peace monitoring missions were deployed in an 
inverse pattern with a preponderance of low complexity conflicts receiving a peace 
monitoring deployment.  Peacekeeping missions were the only type to not display a 
distinct pattern based on conflict complexity.  The output demonstrated a strong link 
between deployed mission type, excepting peacekeeping, and conflict complexity.  The 
data strongly supported hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2: Peace Operations mandate determines the force capacity.  It was 
assumed that peace monitoring missions would deploy the smallest number of troops due 
to their limited mission scope.  Traditional peacekeeping missions were assumed to have 
the next smallest force as their interpositional mission function requires sufficient 
numbers to deter an attack.  Peace enforcement missions were assumed to be larger than 
peacekeeping due to the requirement that they contain sufficient numbers and capacities 
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to deter or defeat belligerents acting against the interests of the mandate.  Finally, 
peacebuilding missions were assumed have the largest number of troops due to the varied 
and complex mission tasks they carry out; many that encompass either in part or in whole 
the mission tasks of other mission types.  Table 4.3 was compiled to determine the mean 
and median size of missions and capacity of deployed personnel categorized by mandate 
type.  This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 
missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.          















Peacebuilding. N = 20 
Mission Size         Mean: 10,516         Median 8,873  
Troop Capacity     Mean: $33,382     Median: $17,017 
  
UNOSOM II UN 28,559 $96,885 No 
UNAMID UN 23,448 $11,161 Ongoing 
MONUSCO UN 21,222 $15,963 Ongoing 
MONUC-b UN 20,796 $11,965 Yes 
UNAMSIL UN 17,477 $3,406 Yes 
UNMIL UN 15,250 $4,370 Yes 
UNMISS UN 13,035 $16,481 Ongoing 
MINUSCA UN 12,361 $14,043 Yes 
MINUSMA UN 11,693 $30,240 Ongoing 
UNMIS UN 9,817 $17,552 Yes 
UNAMIR II UN 7,750 $3,444 Yes 
ONUMOZ UN 6,576 $19,132 Yes 
ONUCI UN 6,560 $8,589 Yes 
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ONUB UN 5,665 $12,994 Yes 
UNTAG UN 4,493 $27,084** Yes 
MINURCAT UN 3,814 $36,712 Yes 
MINURCA UN 1,505 $26,579 Yes 
MISSANG-GB AU 250 $31,106 No 
CPAG-SA OTHER 33 $136,917 Yes 
EU SSR OTHER 8 $143,010 No 
Peace Enforcement. N = 9  
Mission Size         Mean: 6,715       Median 2,990  
Troop Capacity     Mean: $7,287     Median: $9,258 
 
AMISOM AU 22,126 $9,258 Ongoing 
ECOMOG-L REC 12,040 $2,949 Yes 
MNJTF OTHER 10,000 $12,387 Ongoing 
ECOMOG-SL REC 9,000 $3,719 No 
AFISMA AU 2,990 $9,816 No 
MICOPAX AU 2,800 $9,258 No 
MISAB AU 800 $3,906 Yes 
FOMUC OTHER 380 $3,577 Yes 
CEN-SAD REC 300 $10,715 Yes 
Peacekeeping. N = 18 
Mission Size         Mean: 2,702         Median 2,308  
Troop Capacity     Mean: $14,205     Median: $9,011 
  
UNAVEM III UN 7,294 $9,824 Yes 
AMIS 2 AU 6,295 $8,197 Yes 
MISCA OTHER 5,142 $10,205 No 
UNISFA UN 4,529 $3,224 Ongoing 
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UNMEE UN 4,209 $39,841 Yes 
ECOMIL REC 3,556 $4,256 Yes 
MONUC-a UN 3,395 $10,050 Yes 
AMIB AU 2,989 $4,958 Yes 
MONUA OTHER 2,484 $7,559 No 
UNAMIR I UN 2,131 $19,656 No 
ECOMICI REC 1,500 $4,256 Yes 
UNAVEM II UN 1,327 $7,892 No 
UNOSOM I  UN 952 $20,490 Yes 
SAPSD AU 750 $56,865 Yes 
ECOMOG-GB REC 712 $4,417 Yes 
ECOMIB REC 700 $10,205 Yes 
MAES OTHER 430 $8,197 Yes 
MINURSO UN 250 $25,606 Ongoing 
Peace Monitoring. N = 19 
Mission Size         Mean: 87            Median: 43 
Troop Capacity     Mean: $16,874   Median: $7,111 
 
AMISEC AU 432 $7,111 Yes 
AMIS 1 AU 390 $4,958 Yes 
UNOMSIL UN 139 $13,302 Yes 
OAU NMOG II AU 132 $6,629 Yes 
UNOMUR UN 82 $22,095 No 
MINUCI REC 75 $5,040 Yes 
OMIB AU 67 $7,865 Yes 





AU 43 $3,906 
Yes 
OAU NMOG I AU 40 $8,641 No 
MIOC / OMIC4 UN 39 $4,958 Yes 
JVC OTHER 30 $50,190 Yes 
JMC and IMU REC 25 $135,113 Yes 
OMIC 3 AU 25 $3,577 Yes 
OMIC AU 20 $3,719 No 
OAU MOT AU 15 $9,302 No 
OMIC 2 AU 14 $3,577 Yes 
UNASOG UN 9 $4,488** Yes 
OAU Mission to 
Western Sahara 
UN not available $9,302** 
Yes 
*Average troop investment is the average expense per troop in constant 2016 USD.  The figure is 
produced by dividing the total nation military expenditure of a TCC by the total armed service members 
of that country.  The numbers are then combined based on numbers of troops to produce the average 
investment into each troop in a mission.  Calculations were based on top ten contributors to each 
mission. 
**Numbers are an estimate based on known TCCs for these missions.  Exact mission composition is 
unavailable.   
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International 
Peace Institute (2018); SIPRI (2018); IISS (1990-2015); Williams (2016). 
The analysis found that mandate type had a strong correlation with mission troop 
size and capacity.  Peacebuilding missions averaged 10,516 troops, peace enforcement 
missions 6,715 troops, peacekeeping missions 2,702 troops, and peace monitoring 
missions 87 troops.  These totals were in line with the hypotheses and demonstrate that 
the mission type had a strong influence over the mission size.    
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However, size is not the only determinant of force capacity.  As previously 
discussed, there have been events in peacekeeping history when troops were unable to 
execute a task based not on sufficient troop numbers, but on a lack of training and skills 
(Jett, 1999; Daniel, 2013).  Troop contributing country annual expenditure per solider is 
the common measure of the capacity of individual soldiers.  This figure captured both the 
training and equipping a soldier from a particular nation would receive on average.  Table 
4.3 also captured the average expenditure per troop for all relevant peace operation 
missions.  This calculation encapsulated the organic troop training capability of the troop 
contributing countries.  External support to bolster troop capability is assessed later under 
the hypotheses focusing on partnered and supported missions.   
The analysis demonstrated disparate findings for average troop capacity for each 
mandate type.  Peacebuilding operations had the highest average troop capacity based on 
a mean and a median analysis.  These numbers are reflective of large UN peacebuilding 
missions that attract troop contributions from outside the Sub-Saharan region.  Peace 
enforcement missions had the lowest mean capacity but the second highest median 
capacity.  Peacekeeping operations were near the average capacity numbers.  Peace 
monitoring was second highest on average but lowest on a median basis.  The 
peacebuilding numbers demonstrated a correlation to better trained and equipped troops 
being deployed for the complex tasks associated with peacebuilding.  The peace 
enforcing numbers display the prevalence of peace enforcement missions being 
conducted by regional economic community members that are on average less well 
funded than troops deployed from outside the Sub-Saharan Africa region.  The 
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peacekeeping and monitoring numbers were mainly reflective of the lower per troop 
spending norms in earlier years when these missions were more prevalent. 
Mandates did impact the size and capacity of troops deployed.  Peace Monitoring 
missions were the smallest missions in terms of size and had capacities that ranged 
widely.  Peacekeeping missions had the next largest size and a capacity near the mean for 
all operations.  Peace enforcement missions had the second largest size but a limited 
capacity reflective of their being predominantly sourced from regional economic 
communities.  Finally, peacebuilding missions were both the largest and had the highest 
capacity.  These findings validated hypothesis two.     
Hypothesis 3: The force capacity determines peace operations outcome.  Does 
increased force capacity equate better peace operations outcome.  Troop numbers and 
TCC spending per troop have been closely correlated with mission type.  Therefore, it 
was necessary to examine these outputs by mandate category.  Table 4.4 explains 
outcomes categorized by mission type and above or below the median level for number 
of troops and per troop capacity.  This table excluded parallel supporting operations and 
counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.    
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Table 4.4.  Peace Operations Mission Force Capacity and Mandate: Mission Outcome 









N = 19 
Complete Partial   
Force Size 
(Number of troops) 
Larger* - 7 2 - 
 Smaller 1 8 1 - 
Troop Investment 
($ per solider) 
Larger - 7 2 - 
 Smaller 1 8 1 - 
Peacekeeping N = 18     
Force Size 
(Number of troops) 
Larger 1 6 1 1 
 Smaller 3 2 2 2 
Troop Investment 
($ per solider) 
Larger 2 4 1 2 
 Smaller 2 4 2 1 
Peace Enforcement N = 9     
Force Size 
(Number of troops) 
Larger - 1 1 2 
 Smaller - 4 1 - 
Troop Investment 
($ per solider) 
Larger - 2 - 2 
 Smaller - 3 2 - 
Peacebuilding N = 20     
Force Size 
(Number of troops) 
Larger 1 3** 1 5 
 Smaller 5 3** 2 - 
Troop Investment 
($ per solider) 
Larger 4 2 3 1 
 Smaller 2 4*** - 4 
*Note: Larger = above median, Smaller = at or below median. 
** Includes 1 case (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of 
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research. 
*** Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years 
of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research. 
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International 
Peace Institute (2018); World Bank (2018); SIPRI (2018); IISS (1990-2015) Williams (2016). 
 
The comparison of missions that were larger and had more per troop capacity than 
the median for their category provided limited patterns from which to draw conclusions.  
Peace monitoring missions were marginally more successful if they were smaller and had 
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less capacity.  Peacekeeping missions were less likely to fail with a larger mission, but 
the data otherwise showed no clear pattern.  Peace enforcement missions were less likely 
to fail if they were better equipped.  Peacebuilding operations that had a smaller force 
size with more funding produced both the most complete successes and failures.  In total, 
these results gave no clear guidance on the ideal combination of size and capacity.  
Hypothesis 3 was not supported by the findings.       
Hypothesis 4: The intervening organization is a predictor of peace operations 
outcomes.  Different intervening organizations have different restrictions, levels of 
experience, and resources at their disposal.  Balas (2011) found the UN to be more 
experienced and have greater resources.  The AU and regional economic communities 
were found to be less capable and experienced.  Commonly, the African intervenors 
initiated an intervention that then transferred to the UN once adequate political will had 
developed.   
Table 4.5 provides the outcome of peace operations organized by intervenor 
group and mandate type.  This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted 
only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.    
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United Nations. N = 32 
Complete Partial   Totals 
Peace Monitoring 1 4 1 - 6 
Peacekeeping 1 3 3 2 9 
Peacebuilding  5 6* 1 5 17 
Totals 
 
7 13 5 7 32 
African Union. N = 19      
Peace Monitoring - 10 2 - 12 
Peacekeeping 2 3 - - 5 
Peace Enforcement - 1 - 1 2 
Totals 
 
2 14 2 1 19 
Regional Economic 
Communities. N = 9 
     
Peacekeeping 1 2 - 1 4 
Peace Enforcement - 3 2 - 5 
Totals 
 
1 5 2 1 9 
Ad hoc / Other. N = 6      
Peace Monitoring  - 1 - - 1 
Peace Enforcement - 1 - 1 2 
Peacebuilding  
 
1 - 2 - 3 
Totals 1 2 2 1 6 
Totals 
 
11 34 11 10 66 
* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of 
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.   
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations 
(2018); Williams (2016). 
 
The data outlined in Table 4.5 does not validate the hypothesis.  Different 
intervening organizations produced different rates of success in line with their 
demonstrated mission type preferences.  The UN has played in leading a majority of large 
peacebuilding operations that have been generally either successful or are still ongoing.  
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The AU has played a leading role in peace monitoring missions that then transitioned to 
larger UN missions.  As such the AU has produced high rates of partial success with few 
completely successful missions.  Regional economic communities have conducted many 
peace enforcement missions as an intervenor of last resort.  This was reflected in their 
high rate of failure.  Any impact of intervening organization was more closely related to 
the mandate type than an impact from the organization.  Hypothesis 4 was not supported 
by the data.           
Hypothesis 5: Robust mandates produce higher peace operation success rates.  
Robust mandates describes peace enforcement missions and those peacebuilding 
operations mandated to employ deterrent force.  These offensive capabilities are designed 
to deter attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians, and/or assist in 
maintaining law and order.  These mandates frequently include language authorizing the 
use of all necessary means to defend the mandate or protect civilians.  The offensive use 
of force differentiates robust from traditional operations (United Nations, 2018).  
Robustness is contrasted by traditional peacekeeping that allowed for use of force only in 
self-defense of the peacekeeping force itself (Diehl & Balas, 2014).   
Table 4.6 provides the outcome of robust and traditional defensive postured 
mandates.  This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 
missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.        
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Complete Partial Failure Ongoing Total 
Yes 2 10 3 6 21 
     Peace Enforcement  - 5 2 1 8 
     Peacebuilding (Robust) 2 5* 1 5 13 
      
No 9 24 8 4 45 
      
Total  11 34 11 10 66 
* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of 
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research. 
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations 
(2018); Williams (2016). 
 
Robust missions produced fewer complete or partial successes.  Robust 
peacebuilding missions produced near average outputs and peace enforcement missions 
produced dismal results with no complete successes.  These results validated the view 
that violence itself cannot address the underlying causes of the conflict; should be 
employed as only a part of a strategy; and that peace operations succeed most where there 
is peace to be kept (Fortna, 2008).  Lower outputs of complete success could be expected 
due to the prevalence of deployment to complex conflicts such as the South Sudanese 
Civil War and Africa’s World War.  However, robust mandates failed to keep pace with 
even modest expectations.  The data did not support hypothesis 5.      
Hypothesis 6: Sequential operations lead to greater peace operation success 
rates.  The terms sequential, serialized, or transitioned operations all refer to the same 
construct.  These are operations in which one mission performs duties in before or after 
the mission of a different named mission without a break in mandated responsibility for 
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the same temporal space (Diehl & Balas, 2014).  Table 4.7 compared the outcome of 
operations based on whether or not they were part of a serial.  This table excluded 
parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary 
responsibility for a conflict response.      










Complete Partial   Total 
Yes 4 29* 7 7 47 
No 7 5 4 3 19 
Total  11 34 11 10 66 
* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of 
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research. 
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations 
(2018); Williams (2016). 
 
The results demonstrated that sequential missions produced nearly the same rate 
of successful outcome as standalone missions.  Sequential missions do stand out in terms 
of producing partially successful missions, but were much less likely to result in a 
complete success.  Serials were nearly as likely as standalone missions to produce a 
resilient peace only if the chains of intervention were counted as a whole (i.e. only the 
impact from the final mission in the serial).  The data did not support hypothesis 6.      
The most common pattern was a serial commencing with either a regional 
economic community or an AU led mission that then transferred to a UN led mission.   
The initial missions were nearly always either peace monitoring or peace enforcement 
and deployed to an active conflict without an existent cease fire agreement.  The follow-
on missions were mainly peacekeeping operations after a cease-fire was established.  
These missions then transferred to a peacebuilding mission after the signing of a peace 
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agreement.  These UN missions were given robust enforcement authorization in those 
conflicts in which violence continued (Derblom, Hagstrom Frisell, & Schmidt, 2008).  
While this was the dominant model, there were many other subgroups.  In some 
operations a temporary enforcement mission was deployed alongside the primary mission 
to reduce the violence to a manageable level or to defeat a miscreant group that is 
preventing the peace process from progressing.  Regardless of the exact pattern, multiple 
operations have become the norm (Balas, 2011).  In more recent operations it has become 
rare for only one peace operation to be deployed to halt or prevent a descent into violence 
as evidenced by nine of 12 ongoing or recently closed missions being part of a serial. 
Bridging and hand-overs are the two types of sequential operations.  Bridging is 
when one mission deploys for a relatively short period of time with the express purpose 
of preparing for another organization to take over responsibilities (Balas, 2011).  The EU 
led Operation Artemis was a bridging mission authorized by the UN Security Council to 
stabilize an area of the DRC in preparation for the deployment of MONUC.  Artemis 
deployed for a limited duration with specific goals, and the intention of bridging to 
another mission (Diehl & Balas, 2014).  Hand-overs differ in that they are a permanent 
change of responsibility.  Hand-overs can be either from one organization to another.  
Such as were the cases of the ECOWAS missions ECOMOG and ECOMICI transferring 
responsibility over to the UN missions ECOMIL and ONUCI after the establishment of 
peace agreements in the Liberia – Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
War and the First Ivoirian Civil War respectively.  Handovers have also occurred within 
an organization in response to a changing conditions.  This was the case in Rwanda when 
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the UN reflagged UNAMIR as UNAMIR II in 1994.  UNAMIR II transformed the 
mandate from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and added several thousand troops to the 
authorized numbers (United Nations, 2001).     
Sequential operations have composed a key component of the African peace 
operation landscape.  The established patterns embolden regional actors to intervene to 
prevent an active intra-state conflict from becoming a regional issue.  The regional actors 
have done so with a tacit understanding that the UN will assist once a cease-fire is in 
place (Balas, 2011).  This norm has enabled the UN to avoid leading peace enforcement 
operations and local actors to utilize their limited resources to the greatest effect.        
Hypothesis 7: Force capacity with parallel support missions leads to greater 
peace operations success.  Parallel peace operations are those that are deployed at the 
same time, in the same conflict, but under different lead organizations (Balas, 2011).  The 
supported or primary operation is mandated to take action focused on the conflict.  The 
supporting operation is mandated to aid and assist the primary mission.  It is an auxiliary 
operation that seeks to assist the supported operation by doing what it is not mandated or 
not able to accomplish.  Most often, the supported mission is a peacebuilding mandate 
under the auspices of the UN or AU, while the supporting mission is peace enforcement 
or training mission led by either a western power or a regional organization.  Parallel 
peace operations allow organizations to focus on their strengths and rely on allied 
organizations or countries to complement their efforts.  Table 4.8 compared the outcomes 
of missions that were or were not supported by a parallel supporting peace operation.  
Table 4.9 listed each supported mission organized by mandate type.  These tables 
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excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had 
primary responsibility for a conflict response.    









Mission Supported by a 
Parallel Mission? 
Complete Partial   Total 
Yes 5 14* - 4 23 
No 6 20 11 6 43 
 11 34 11 10 66 
* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of 
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research. 
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations 
(2018); Williams (2016). 
 
 















ONUB PBO UN SAPSD Complete Success  
MINURCAT PBO UN EUFOR-Chad  Complete Success  
UNAMSIL PBO UN Operation Palliser & Basilica-
Silkman 
Complete Success  
UNMEE PKO UN OLMEE, AULMEE Complete Success  
MAES PKO AU Operation Democracy in the 
Comoros 
Complete Success  
MONUC-b PBO UN Operation Artemis, EUSEC, and 
EUFOR-RD 
Partial Success 
UNAMIR II PBO UN Operation Turquois Partial Success 
ECOMOG-L PEO REC UNOMIL Partial Success 
MISAB PEO OTHER Unnamed French Operation Partial Success 
AFISMA PEO AU Operation Serval / EUTM  Partial Success 
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UNOSOM I  PKO UN UNITAF Partial Success 
ECOMICI PKO REC Operation Licorne Partial Success 
ECOMIL PKO REC JTF Liberia Partial Success 
AMIB PKO AU SAPSD Partial Success  
MISCA PKO AU Operation Sangaris Partial Success 
AMIS 2 PKO AU EU Support to AMIS2 Partial Success 
MINUCI MON UN Operation Licorne Partial Success 
ONUCI PBO UN Operation Licorne Partial Success* 
UNMIL PBO UN  JTF Liberia Partial Success* 
MINUSCA PBO UN EUFOR RCA / Operation Sangaris Ongoing 
MINUSMA PEO UN Operation Serval and Barkhane / 
EUTM  
Ongoing 
MNJTF PEO OTHER Operation Barkhane Ongoing 
AMISOM PEO AU EUTM Somalia Ongoing 
* Mission where elapsed time since mission end has not reached the five years of peace criterion for 
complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research. 
Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations 
(2018); Williams (2016). 
 
Missions supported by a parallel operation were more likely to be a complete 
success, nearly equally likely to be a partial success, and have never failed.  The support 
of a parallel mission contributed greatly to producing higher rates of success and lower 
rates of failure.  Hypothesis seven was validated by the data. 
There have been frequent examples of parallel supporting missions.  Examples 
include the French Operation Barkhane’s support of MINUSMA and the MNJTF; the 
U.S. JTF’s support of ECOMIL in Liberia; and numerous EU training missions.  The 
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practice maximizes the mutual benefit from the parallel efforts of the multiple 
organizations.   
Nations or organizations may wish to deploy a parallel supporting mission rather 
than join an established mission for several reasons.  The supporting mission gives 
increased control over the organization they support or may gain access to be able to 
support national interests.  For example, Operation Licorne in Cote d’Ivoire gave the 
French military a legal UN mandate to protect French citizens and property during the 
First Ivoirian Civil War (French Ministry of Defense, 2015).   
The practice also benefits the supported organization.  Partnered missions often 
open doors to much bilateral assistance that is provided by nations such as the US, 
France, Britain, and China (Williams, 2016).  For example, in the Central African 
Republic War France was not only providing Operation Sangaris as a peace enforcement 
mission to stabilize the capital, but also providing training and equipping support to both 
MISCA and its successor mission MINUSCA (World Peace Foundation, 2018).  It is a 
logical leap that a nation that supports a mission with the expense of a supporting mission 
will also be more vested in ensuring the mission personnel are capable of accomplishing 
their mandate.  This support also correlates to mission support on the UN Security 
Council if the supporting state is a member.    
The practice also enables parties to focus on their capability strengths and 
economize peace support.  The devision of effort between French and UN forces in Mali 
is one such example.  French Operation Barkhane forces focus on the employment of 
close air support and direct-action special operations forces to remove terrorist leadership 
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and assets.  MINUSMA peacekeepers focus on controlling territory with large numbers 
of troops.  The MINUSMA troop contributing nations focus on their ability to field large 
numbers of troops necessary for securing large geographical sections and the French are 
focus on their capacity to provide limited numbers of highly skilled assets at key times 
(Charbonneau, 2017).  Parallel support operations enable each intervenor to focus on 
their inherent strengths and cover the other’s limitations for mutual benefit.   
Hypothesis 8: Force capacity with Western power assistance programs will lead 
to greater peace operation success rates.  The impacts of two programs were analyzed to 
determine their effect on outcome.  The first program group was the US African Crisis 
Response Initiative (ACRI) program that grew into the present day African Contingency 
Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program (Karis, 2009).  The second program 
group was the French led program that has grown into the present-day EU African Peace 
Facility (APF).  These programs each contribute to African peace operations via funding 
the training, equipping, and sustainment of troops (European Center for Development 
Policy Management, 2018).  These programs have been the practical expression of the 
rhetoric of “African Solutions to African Problems” with an end goal that African nations 
provide the capable troops for African peace operations assisted as necessary with 
western funds (Williams, 2016).   The impacts of a peace operation being supported by 
one or both of these programs was incorporated into Table 4.10.  Table 4.11 listed all 
missions that received assistance for a US or European Assistance program sorted by 
outcome.  These tables excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 
missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.      
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Complete Partial   Total 
Yes 6 16* 2 9 33 
No 5 18 9 1 33 
Total 11 34 11 10 66 
* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of 
peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research. 
Sources: Karis (2009); Vic (2017); European Center for Development and Policy Management (2018). 
  














MAES PKO AU EU Complete Success  
ONUB PBO UN US Complete Success  
UNMEE PKO UN US Complete Success  
UNAMSIL PBO UN US Complete Success  
MINURCAT PBO UN US and EU Complete Success  
ECOMOG-GB PKO REC US and EU Complete Success  
FOMUC PEO REC EU Partial Success 
AMISEC MON AU EU Partial Success 
AFISMA PEO AU EU Partial Success 
MONUC-a PKO UN US Partial Success 
MONUC-b PBO UN US Partial Success 
ECOMIL PKO REC US Partial Success 
UNOMSIL MON UN US Partial Success 
UNMIS PBO UN US Partial Success 
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UNMIL PBO UN US Partial Success* 
ONUCI PBO UN US and EU Partial Success* 
MISAB PEO OTHER US and EU Partial Success 
MINURCA PBO UN US and EU Partial Success 
MISCA PKO AU US and EU Partial Success 
ECOMICI PKO REC US and EU Partial Success 
AMIS 1 MON AU US and EU Partial Success 
AMIS 2 PKO AU US and EU Partial Success 
OMIB MON AU US Failure 
MICOPAX PEO REC US and EU Failure 
MONUSCO PBO UN US Ongoing 
UNMISS PBO UN US Ongoing 
UNISFA PKO UN US Ongoing 
UNAMID PBO UN US Ongoing 
MINUSCA PBO UN US and EU Ongoing 
ECOMIB PKO REC US and EU Ongoing 
MNJTF  PEO OTHER US and EU Ongoing 
MINUSMA PBO UN US and EU Ongoing 
AMISOM PEO AU US and EU Ongoing 
* Mission where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for 
complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research. 
Sources: Karis (2009); Vic (2017); European Center for Development and Policy Management (2018). 
Missions assisted by a mission support program were slightly more likely to be a 
complete success, equally likely to be a partial success, and significantly less likely to fail 
when compared to unassisted missions.  MICOPAX and OMIB were the only two 
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instances of assisted missions failing.  Mission assistance programs contributed greatly to 
ensuring operations did not fail.  Hypothesis six was validated by the data.   
Assistance programs supported African peace operations through two main 
methods; preparation of deployment and the sustainment of deployed forces.  The U.S. 
has focused on preparatory train and equip programs.  This trend began with the ACRI 
and then transitioned to the ACOTA program.  These predeployment programs enhanced 
the capacity of African troops to conduct peace operations by providing training and 
equipment (usually non-lethal) to African forces that would deploy as part of an AU or 
UN led peace operation (Karis, 2009).  The EU’s African Peace Facility (APF) has 
focused on the sustainment and maintenance of African troops in the field (European 
Center for Development Policy Management, 2018).  Together these programs have 
trained, deployed, and sustained African peace operations forces.     
ACRI operated from 1997 to 2002 with the intent to support peace operations 
without U.S. troops intervening in African conflicts. ACRI trained 9,000 troops from 
eight partner nations.  ACRI trained troops deployed in support of over 13 different peace 
operations (Karis, 2009).   
ACRI became ACOTA in 2002.  ACOTA trained whole units immediately prior 
to deployment.  ACOTA also changed the curriculum focus from training on monitoring 
and observation tasks to a focus on offensive and defensive military operations more 
closely aligned with the needs of enforcement missions (Handy, 2010; Berman, 2002).  
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ACOTA trained 353,871 troops, composing 417 units, from 26 different nations 
as of 2017 (Rainey, 2018).  Today it is a partnership led by the US, but with support and 
coordination across US, British, and French governments. 
The African Peace Facility (APF) is a funding mechanism that draws funds from 
the EU development fund to support the African Peace Security Architecture (APSA).  
The APF was developed in response to African leaders’ call for assistance in facilitating 
African responses to African conflicts at the 2003 Maputo Conference (African Union, 
2018).  It was formed in 2004 and began delivering funds in 2007.  The APF’s overall 
goal is to enhance the capacity and functioning of the APSA by funding peace operations; 
developing the capacity of AU and the regional economic communities; and funding 
conflict prevention and mediation efforts.  The APF has expended 1.9 billion euros from 
its inception to 2006 (European Center for Development Policy Management, 2018).   
Assistance programs have facilitated African troops performing African peace 
operations.  Frequently the US led on training and equipping forces via the ACOTA 
program and the EU has been the primary funding source of sustainment.  These 
programs have each assisted the deploying and maintaining African troops in the field.   
Hypothesis 9: Force capacity that includes both a parallel supporting mission 
and a Western Power assistance program will produce the greatest rates of peace 
operations success.  My final hypothesis is the fusion of hypotheses six and seven; peace 
operations supported by both a parallel supporting mission and a peace operation 
assistance program will produce the highest rates of success.  The results were compiled 
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into Table 4.12.  This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 
66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.             
Table 4.12.  Peace Operations Assisted by a Mission Support Program and a Parallel Peace 









Assisted and Partnered 
Mission? 
Complete Partial   Total 
Yes 4 10* - 4 18 
No 7 24 11 6 48 
Total 11 34 11 10 66 
* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years 
of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.
Sources: Karis (2009); Vic (2017); European Center for Development and Policy Management 
(2018); Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations 
(2018); Williams (2016). 
 
Missions that combined the impacts of partnering with a parallel mission and a 
mission support program produced resilient peace at a superior rate to those missions that 
do not.  Additionally, these missions never failed.  These figures demonstrated a pattern 
of success related to external support that bolsters the capacity of a peace operation.  
Hypothesis eight was sustained by the data.   
Summary of Results 
My nine hypotheses were developed to test the linkages between conflict, 
mandate, intervenor capacity, and outcome.  Hypothesis one tested the linkage between 
conflict and mandate.  Hypothesis two tested the connection between mandate and 
intervening force capacity.  Hypothesis three tested the relationship between intervenor 
force capacity and outcome.  Hypotheses four and five examined links between mandate 
and outcome.  Hypotheses six, seven, eight, and nine examined the impact of various 
factors augmenting intervenor force capacity.  
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Hypothesis 1, the conflict characteristics determine the peace operation mandate, 
was strongly supported.  Peace enforcement and peacebuilding operations were more 
frequently deployed to medium or highly complex conflicts.  Peace monitoring missions 
were predominantly deployed to low complexity conflicts and peacekeeping showed no 
definitive pattern.  Every instance of a peace monitoring or peacekeeping operation 
deploying to a medium or highly complex conflict resulted in a transition to a more 
robust operation.  The data indicated a strong confirmation of hypothesis 1. 
 Hypothesis 2, peace operations mandate determines the force capacity, was 
partially supported.  Mandates determined the quantity but not the capacity of troops 
deployed.  Peace Monitoring missions were the smallest missions in terms of size and 
had capacities that ranged widely.  Peacekeeping missions had the next largest size and a 
capacity near the mean for all operations.  Peace Enforcement missions had the second 
largest size but a limited capacity reflective of their being predominantly sourced from 
regional economic communities.  Finally, peacebuilding missions were both the largest 
and had the highest capacity.  These findings predominantly supported hypothesis two.   
Hypothesis 3, the force capacity determines peace operations outcome, was not 
supported.  The comparison of missions that were larger and had more per troop capacity 
than the median for their category provided limited patterns from which to draw 
conclusions.  Peace monitoring missions were marginally more successful if they were 
smaller and had less capacity.  Peacekeeping missions were less likely to fail with a 
larger mission, but the data otherwise showed no clear pattern.  These results presented 
no clear indication of an ideal combination of size and capacity.  
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Hypothesis 4, the intervening organization is a predictor of peace operations 
outcomes was not supported by the data.  No significant differentiation was found 
between organizations when mission type was accounted for.  The UN has played in 
leading a majority of large peacebuilding operations that have been generally either 
successful or are still ongoing.  The AU has played a leading role in peace monitoring 
missions that later transitioned to larger UN missions.  As such the AU has produced high 
rates of partial success with few completely successful missions.  Regional economic 
communities have conducted many peace enforcement missions as an intervenor of last 
resort.  This was reflected in their high rate of failure.   
Hypothesis 5, robust mandates produce higher peace operation success rates, was 
not supported.  Robust missions rarely produced a resilient peace and performed no better 
at producing partial successes than non-robust operations.  Peace enforcement mission 
performance was the most egregious having never produced a resilient peace without first 
transitioning to a peacebuilding mission.  My fifth hypothesis was not supported by the 
data.   
Hypothesis 6, sequential operations lead to greater peace operation success rates, 
was not supported by the data.  Serialized conflicts failed as often as standalone conflicts 
and produced low rates of complete success.  Serials were as likely as standalone 
missions to produce resilient peace only if considering only the final mission in a serial.  
Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported.   
Hypothesis 7, force capacity with parallel support missions leads to greater peace 
operations success, was strongly supported.  Missions supported by a parallel operation 
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were more likely to be a complete success, nearly equally likely to be a partial success, 
and have never failed.  The support of a parallel mission contributed greatly to producing 
higher rates of success and lower rates of failure.   
Hypothesis 8, force capacity with Western power assistance programs will lead to 
greater peace operation success rates, was strongly supported.  Missions assisted by a 
mission support program were slightly more likely to be a complete success, equally 
likely to be a partial success, and significantly less likely to fail when compared to 
unassisted missions.   
Hypothesis 9, force capacity that includes both a parallel supporting mission and a 
Western Power assistance program will produce the greatest rates of peace operations 
success, was strongly supported.  Missions that combined the impacts of partnering with 
a parallel support mission and a mission assistance program produced resilient peace at a 
superior rate to those missions that did not and have never failed.  These figures 
demonstrated a pattern of success related to external support that bolsters the capacity of 
a peace operation.  Hypothesis nine was strongly supported by the data. 
 Combining insights gained from multiple hypotheses led to several conclusions.  
First, the conflict complexity study conducted to examine hypothesis 2 contextualized the 
results of all subsequent hypotheses.  Serialized were on average deployed to much more 
challenging situations that standalone operations.  Serialized operations on average 
produced similar outcomes in spite of this headwind.  Similarly, robust missions’ failure 
to establish peace at a superior rate to traditional missions is less surprising when the 
complexity of conflicts peace enforcement and peace building missions were deployed to 
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are considered.  Robust missions were deployed at higher rates to high and medium 
complex conflicts than either peace monitoring or peacekeeping missions.  One would 
therefore expect the failure of robust missions to be more dramatic than observed.  
Similarly, the assessment that more capacity and size do not equate greater success fails 
to acknowledge that larger and more complex missions were deployed to conflicts more 
likely destined for failure.  Therefore, the lack of definitive pattern based on force size 
and capacity can be interpreted as capacity overcoming adverse conditions to achieve 
results on par with conflicts that exhibit more favorable conditions.          
Differing conclusions on the importance of force capacity was a second overall 
conclusion.  Augmented capacity (hypotheses 7, 8, and 9), but not greater endemic 
capacity (hypothesis 3), produced greater outcomes.  The non-support of hypotheses 3 
and 4 indicated robust mandates implemented by capable intervenors does not make a 
panacea for success.  However, the strong support for hypotheses 6, 7, and 8 
demonstrated that missions that received assistance and partnered support greatly 
improved outcomes.  This may be due to the targeted nature of training and equipping 
under mission assistance programs.  A TCCs per soldier capacity did not assess if a 
soldier’s training and equipment was specifically targeted to mission requirements.  
However, assistance programs, notably ACOTA, tailored training and equipment to 
mission requirements (Karis, 2009).  
Peace enforcement missions’ utility was linked to specific circumstances.  Great 
success was realized in the international responses to conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and others when peace enforcement missions were deployed as a parallel 
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supporting mission in support of a larger peace building mission.  These supporting 
missions produced conditions conductive to peacebuilding where they did not previously 
exist.  Even in the case of Somalia, UNITAF was able to temporarily create the 
conditions in which UNOSOM could have succeeded (United Nations, 2001).  If there is 
no peace in place peace must be established but, force must be targeted to specific 
objectives in support of a larger strategy.  
 A final takeaway was that more recent missions were characterized as more 
complex conflicts being addressed with those types of interventions shown to produce the 
greatest rates of success.  Half of current or recently closed missions had a parallel 
supporting operation and 11 of 12 benefited from an assistance program.  Essentially, 
operations post-2015 have evolved towards those practices seen to better produce 
resilient peace.  The hope is that these most complex of conflicts, such as Africa’s World 
War, will end in similar fashion to the Liberia-LURD war that was nearly equitable in its 




   
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
What factors have led to successful outcomes in international peace operations 
conducted in Sub Saharan African countries?  What factors explain mission failure?  I 
proposed a basic theory of peace operations that linked conflict conditions to mandate 
design to the capability of an intervening force deployed for mission implementation 
developed from arguments and empirical results of previous research.    
Data on 86 peace operations that occurred in 23 African states covering 33 
separate conflict periods between 1990 and 2015 was analyzed.  My main findings 
showed that mandates were derived from conflict assessments and determined the size of 
intervening force required.  The results also indicated that neither the size of an 
intervening force, nor the lead-organization, nor mandate robustness (offensive 
deterrence capacity), nor sequencing of operations were predictors of mission success or 
failure.  However, implementation forces that included parallel support operations and/or 
mission assistance from Western great powers had higher levels of successful outcomes. 
Missions were distributed between host countries, conflict complexities, mandate 
types, intervening organizations, and produced varied outcomes.  38 peace operations 
were deployed to 14 high complexity conflicts in eight countries.  30 peace operations 
were deployed to 11 medium complexity conflicts in nine countries.  18 peace operations 
were deployed to eight low complexity conflicts in seven countries.  Mission leadership 
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varied. The UN led 33 missions, the AU or OAU led 21 missions, regional economic 
communities led nine, and individual countries or ad hoc coalitions led 21 other 
operations. 14 missions were still ongoing on April 20, 2019 (the cutoff date for this 
research).  Three successful missions could only be partially evaluated due to the 
temporal period selected for this study.  20 missions were parallel supporting missions; 
deployed to compliment the efforts of 23 supported peace operations.  The outcome of 
parallel supporting missions was measured in the success or failure of the mission they 
supported.  47 of the 66 non-supporting missions were part of a sequential series while 19 
were standalone missions. Outcome varied with 16 missions completely successful, 44 
partially successful, 12 failed, and 14 missions either ongoing or recently closed.  
Completely and partially successful missions together composed 60 of 75 completed 
missions.  20% of missions failed.  
Discussion 
Peace operations were successful in some countries, but not in others.  Some 
countries such as Namibia and South Africa seemed destined for success and succeeded.  
They both had a signed peace agreement, higher than regional average GDP per capita, 
and relatively low annual conflict related deaths prior to peace operation deployment.  
Other countries seemed destined for failure and failed.  Angola twice returned to war 
during the presence of a peace operation and finally found peace in the absence of a 
peace operation.  Angola suffered external support to rebel forces, the presence of readily 
lootable minerals, high levels of violence, and a moderate GDP per capita.  However, 
some missions succeeded in the face of great challenges.  Missions deployed to Liberia 
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and Sierra Leone faced open conflict with no peace agreement, the presence of readily 
lootable minerals, external support to rebel forces, relatively low GDPs per capita, and 
extreme rates of battlefield deaths.  However, peace operations proved ultimately 
successful in both nations.  These examples illustrate that success or failure could not be 
predicted on the conflict characteristics alone.        
Mission outputs varied with mandate type.  Peacebuilding missions, especially 
larger multidimensional missions, produced the greatest rates of establishing a resilient 
peace.  Small peacebuilding missions with limited objectives such as EU-SSR and 
ECOMIG (both in Guinea Bissau) frequently failed.  However, larger UN led missions 
such as ONUMOZ in Mozambique, ONUB in Burundi, and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone 
succeeded so long as international will to support was maintained.  Even UNOSOM II in 
Somalia reduced the severity of the Second Somali War.  However, the mission withdrew 
in failure after international supporters including the United States withdrew support.  
Overall peacebuilding missions produced seven complete successes, seven partial 
successes, four failures, and have eight ongoing missions.     
Peacekeeping missions were the second most successful mission type.  
Peacekeeping missions led to resilient peace including SAPSD in Burundi, MAES in the 
Comoros Islands, UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and ECOMOG-GB in Guinea Bissau.  
These missions all benefited from the presence of a peace agreement pre-deployment and 
limited objectives in line with a medium or low complexity conflict.  MONUA in Angola 
and UNAMIR I in Rwanda were examples of peacekeeping failures.  These missions 
each failed to prevent the outbreak of a new war.  They were each limited due to the 
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absence of a credible deterrent threat.  Overall peacekeeping missions produced five 
complete successes, ten partial successes, two failures, and three ongoing missions.   
Peace monitoring missions produced the greatest rate of overall success, but only 
once produced a resilient peace without the transition to a larger mission.  UNASOG in 
Chad was the one example of a complete success.  UNASOG’s mission was limited in 
scope and took place after the signing of a peace agreement in an intrastate conflict.  
Other missions generally either served as a tripwire to the deployment of a larger mission 
or saw a return to violence shortly following mission withdrawal.  Overall peace 
monitoring missions produced two complete success, 16 partial successes, and three 
failures. 
 Peace enforcement missions only produced a completely successful mission when 
acting as a parallel supporting mission.  Complete failures included MICOPAX in the 
Central African Republic and ECOMOG-SL in Sierra Leone.  These missions were failed 
regional economic community attempts to bolster embattled governments.  Partial 
successes included multiple missions in the Central African Republic and AFISMA in 
Mali.  These missions were most notable in their transitions to larger UN missions which 
are ongoing.  A majority of peace enforcement missions were deployed to high 
complexity conflicts.  Overall peace enforcement missions produced two complete 
successes, 11 partial successes, three failures, and three missions are ongoing.   
Outcome by mandate type yields multiple conclusions.  Peacebuilding missions 
are the most likely to establish a resilient peace.  Peacebuilding missions frequently 
succeed in their focus on the underlying conflict conditions.  Peacekeeping missions 
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produce positive outcomes in those conflicts which have favorable conditions including 
an existing peace agreement.  Peace monitoring and enforcement missions lack the ability 
to produce a resilient peace but can serve as a tripwire to a peacebuilding or 
peacekeeping mission.   
Organic force composition and structure analysis did not yield resolute answers.  
Mandate type was a predictor of force composition, capacity, and lead organization.  
However, mission success corelated to neither mission size nor the military expenditures 
of troop contributing countries.  Similarly, there was no clear correlation between lead 
intervening organization and mission outcome.   
Western great power support was found to be extremely beneficial.  The 
deployment of a parallel supporting mission or support from a mission assistance 
program each dramatically improved mission outcome rates.  Parallel supporting 
missions are those deployed to complement another peace operation.  17 parallel 
supporting missions were led by Western powers.  The missions they supported never 
failed.  Similarly, the presence of a mission assistance program demonstrated a marked 
impact on mission outcome.  The United States’ ACRI/ACOTA and the EU’s APF each 
improved outcomes.  Assisted missions that have closed produced six complete 
successes, 16 partial successes, and twice failed.  The greatest rates of success were 
found to be those missions that had both a parallel mission support and the assistance of a 
mission support program.   
In an optimistic note, recent missions were characterized by those traits that led to 
greater rates of success.  Half of ongoing or recently closed operations had a parallel 
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supporting operation and 11 of 12 were assisted via an assistance program.  Operations 
post-2015 evolved towards those practices seen to better produce resilient peace.  The 
hope will be that these most complex of conflicts, such as Africa’s World War in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Tuareg Rebellion in Mali, will be ended in 
similar fashion to the Liberia-LURD war that was nearly equitable in its violence at the 
highpoint of the war. 
My findings indicate that conflict complexity alone is not a definitive predictor of 
success or failure.  The positive examples of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire 
demonstrate the potential for a multifaceted, complex, enduring commitment from the 
international community to end complex conflicts.  The example of UNOSOM II in 
Somalia demonstrates the failure brought about by the withdrawal of international 
commitment.  The failure of the OMIC peace monitoring mission in the Comoros Islands 
demonstrates that an extremely limited response can fail in even the lowest complexity 
conflict.  In summation, conflict complexity is a predictor of the required response but 
not the expected outcome of a peace operation. 
The successful intervention into the Liberia-LURD War was an outlying case 
worthy of note.  The conflict’s primary determinant was credible deterrence provided by 
the overwhelming force of the 4,350 U.S. Marines of JTF Liberia (Sirleaf, as cited in 
Strasser, 2017).  The overwhelming force provided adequate temporal and physical space 
for local and UN led peacebuilding efforts to take root.  Intervention into the Liberia-
LURD War was a unique case of a peace enforcement mission producing a resilient 
peace.       
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My study and its conclusions had many overlaps of agreements and 
disagreements with the existent literature.  I agreed that peace operations generate 
positive results (Dorussen, 2014; Fortna, 2008; Sambanis, 2008).  I found that a majority 
of intervened conflicts with known outcomes ended peacefully and had low rates of 
conflict recidivism.   
My findings provided possible mitigation of issues raised by those who cite 
intervenor capability as the primary challenge to peace operation success.  Numerous 
studies have argued that force capability is key to operations success (Bellamy & 
Williams, 2013; Jett, 1999; Daniel, 2013).  Missions that employed capacity support 
mechanisms succeeded at a high rate regardless of the endemic capability found in the 
troop contributing countries.  Other studies have similarly shown how missions that 
combine a traditional UN operation with the deployment of soldiers from a western or 
regional power augment capacity (Daniel, 2013; Martin-Brule, 2012).  My findings 
indicate that capacity challenges can be overcome through the deployment of parallel 
supporting missions and the implementation of mission support programs.    
I concur with Fortna’s (2008) and Sambanis’ (2008) conclusions that numbers are 
largely irrelevant.  The mission will either be large enough to perform the task or will 
serve as a trip-wire to a more capable mission if the mission is prioritized.  Failures of 
missions in Africa have occurred due to insufficient funding, troop numbers, and support 
to troops in the field (Badmus, 2015).  However, if the conflict is seen as important 
interventions will receive additional support and capacity.  For example, the early failures 
of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone transitioned to successful missions by the 
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United States and Great Brittan respectively.  Missions will generally transition to larger 
more capable forces until the correct match of mandate and intervenor capabilities are 
realized.      
My findings partially contradicted those studies that determined that robust 
mandates negatively affect the success or failure of peace operations (Holmqvist, 2014; 
Rhoads, 2016; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Nascimento, 2018).  I agree that deterrence 
force does not guarantee success and negative outcomes have resulted from primary 
missions employing robust mandates.  However, parallel supporting operations with 
robust mandates have been able to create the conditions for peace where they did not 
otherwise exist (Sandler, 2017; Sambanis, 2008; Thakur, 2014).  The efforts in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire were among the seminal examples of the use of force 
to create the conditions for peace.  My findings indicated that the credible threat or use of 
force is a key element to conflict transformation, but only if nested in a peacebuilding 
effort.   
Studies of peace operations have been dominated by case studies or comparisons 
of select similar cases.  My study has contributed a breadth of analysis to the 
understanding of peace operations and the factors affecting their outcome.  My study has 
taken an expansive 25-year view of peace operations in Sub-Saharan Africa.  My review 
of 86 operations has yielded conclusions on the connections between conflict, mandate, 
and intervening force and empirically demonstrated the impact of parallel support 
missions and assistance programs.  My findings were not revolutionary.  They agreed 
with most existent literature.  The findings contribute in that I add supporting data to 
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lessons originally drawn from limited case numbers.  Policy makers and mission 
designers should recognize the demonstrated importance of support mechanisms which 
augments capacity organic to the mission itself.    
Limitations of Study 
My study took a macro approach to African peace operations.  I examined all 
Sub-Saharan peace operations that occurred from 1990 through 2015.  Commonalities of 
those interventions that did or did not achieve a peaceful outcome were identified.  
However, results were more correlation than causation.  My data and results are useful 
for informing policy decisions, but they are aggregates that cannot provide a fail-safe 
model suitable to all conditions.   
My study did not address the perspectives of the parties to the conflict.  I focused 
upon intervening organizations, peace operations forces, and assistance partners.  I did 
not address the role of those living with the conflict and their effect upon an 
intervention’s success or failure.  A bottom-up analysis would greatly compliment this 
study.  It is after all, local actors who choose whether to return to war (Whalan, 2010).      
My study was also limited in that I did not analyze the actions of missions once 
on the ground.  Outcomes are inevitably influenced by what an actor does or does not do.  
My study evaluated the inputs and a measure of potential in place of actual actions.  
Potential additional variables to refine results could include violence directed toward the 
intervening force and/or characteristics of force leadership. 
My variables relating to conflict complexity are based upon best available 
information, but present two issues.  First, factors leading to conflict recidivism are a 
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proxy for factors challenging the success of a peace operation.  They are not a direct 
measure.  Additionally, to declare a conflict highly complex leads to the false impression 
the conflict can only end with proper intervention.  This is demonstratably false as the 
end of the Second Somali War and the Angola War of the Cities each came after the 
withdrawal of international peace operations.    
Additionally, my findings only examine two trends among many which augment 
mission capacity.  Pre-deployment training standards have been under development for 
UN missions.  There were elements of the African Peace Facility not examined including 
the development of peacekeeping training centers.  An analysis of what proportion of 
troops received said training, equipping, and/or sustainment as well as an expanded list of 
programs may have better captured great power support to peace operations.    
My data was limited to that available in published databases, organizational 
websites, and academic journals.  UN operations have treasure troves of data stored on 
UN websites and available from the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database.  
This information includes mandate texts, troop numbers and composition by month, and 
others.  However, non-UN missions lack a similar resource.  I relied upon journal articles, 
information from the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project conflict 
narratives, and that published in Williams’ (2016) War and Conflict in Africa.  
Information on non-UN led missions remained challenging, but was adequate for the 
compilation of peace operation data.  The compilation of data from these sources enabled 
me to make comparisons between the interventions, but did not permit a full 




My study pointed to several areas for further research.  Western great power 
assistance played a key role in improving outcomes.  How and where should this support 
be directed, and to what level of magnitude, should be more thoroughly examined.  
Potential answers to “how” include whether the tangible support, political votes at the 
UN Security Council, or legitimacy conveyed by support causes the greatest impact in 
outcome.  Additionally, what support produces the greatest impact?  Future research 
should examine whether training, equipping, or financial support has the greatest impact.   
Another direction for study is the change within operations.  My study accounted 
for a mission’s overall mandate and the force at its largest point.  This accounts for 
neither the month to month changes to troop levels nor mandate shifts.  Future studies 
should examine specific missions on a month to month basis seeking to find relationships 
between the deployment of specific capabilities or troops who have completed a specific 
training set and the overall rates of violence in a conflict.  These intra-conflict stats may 
demonstrate more precisely the impacts from various support programs.        
Additionally, the support provided by private military contractors should be 
examined.  Sierra Leone, Angola, and other conflicts in Africa have employed private 
military contractors.  Some have argued that they have been a stabilizing force against 
rebel movements in a similar fashion to peace enforcing parallel supporting operations 
(Ucko, 2016).  A study as to the impact of their employment in an intra-state conflict 
would be welcome. 
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International peace operations deployed to reduce conflict in African states have 
had a positive impact.  Western great power assistance programs drastically improved 
outcomes.  Overall missions with Western support eliminated failure and produced higher 
rates of stable peace outcomes.  Complex conflicts were overcome in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and others via a combined effort involving the UN, the AU, 
regional economic communities, and incorporating great power support.  Perhaps the key 
conclusion is that peace in Africa requires a partnership between regional players and the 
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APPENDIX: OPERATION AND ORGANIZATION NAMES AND ACRONYMS  
Mission Acronym Full Mission Name 
AFISMA African Led International Support Mission to Mali 
AMIB African Mission in Burundi  
AMIS 1 AU Mission in Sudan 
AMIS 2 AU Mission in Sudan 
AMISEC AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the 
Comoros 
AMISOM AU Mission in Somalia 
CEN-SAD Communauté des Etats Sahélo-Sahariens 
CPAG-SA Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group – 
South Africa 
ECOMIB ECOWAS Mission in Bissau 
ECOMICI ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire 
ECOMIL ECOWAS Mission in Liberia 
ECOMOG-GB ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
ECOMOG-L ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
ECOMOG-SL ECOWAS Military Observer Group 
EU SSR EU Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau 
EU Support to AMIS 2 EU Support to AMIS 
EUFOR RCA  EU Military Operation in the CAR 
EUFOR-Chad EU Military Operation in Chad 
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EUFOR-RD EU Force in the DRC 
EUSEC-CONGO EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for 
Security Sector Reform in the DRC 
EUTM Mali EU Training Mission in Mali 
EUTM Somalia EU Training Mission in Somalia 
FOMUC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic 
JMC and IMU Joint Military Commission / International Monitoring 
Unit 
JTF Liberia Joint Task Force Liberia 
JVC Joint Verification Committee 
MAES Electoral and Security Mission to the Comoros 
MICOPAX Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central 
Africa 
MINUCI UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire  
MINURCA UN Mission in the Central African Republic 
MINURCAT UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic 
MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
MINUSCA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in the CAR 
MINUSMA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali 
MIOC / OMIC4 Observer Mission in the Comoros 
MISAB Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic 
MISCA Transitioned to MINUSCA 
MISSANG-GB Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau 
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MNJTF vs Boko Haram Multinational Joint Task Force 
MONUA UN Observer Mission in Angola 
MONUC-a UN Organization Mission in the DRC 
MONUC-b United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC 
MONUSCO UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC 
OAU Mission to Western 
Sahara 
OAU Mission to Western Sahara 
OAU MOT OAU Military Observer Team 
OAU NMOG I OAU Neutral Military Observer Group 
OAU NMOG II OAU Neutral Military Observer Group II 
OAU Observer Mission OAU Observer Mission  
OLMEE, AULMEE OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea/ AU Liaison 
Mission to Ethiopia-Eritrea 
OMIB Observer Mission in Burundi 
OMIC Observer Mission in Comoros 
OMIC 2 Observer Mission in the Comoros 
OMIC 3 Observer Mission in the Comoros 
ONUB UN Mission in Burundi  
ONUCI UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire 
ONUMOZ UN Operation in Mozambique 
Operation Artemis / IEMF International Emergency Multinational Force 
Operation Barkhane Operation Barkhane 
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Operation Basilica and 
Silkman 
Operation Basilica and Silkman 
Operation Democracy in 
the Comoros 
Operation Democracy in the Comoros 
Operation Licorne Operation Licorne 
Operation Palliser Operation Palliser 
Operation Sangaris Operation Sangaris 
Operation Serval Operation Serval 
Operation Turquoise Operation Turquoise  
SAPSD South African Protection Service Detachment 
UNAMID UN/AU Mission in Darfur 
UNAMIR I UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
UNAMIR II UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda II 
UNAMSIL UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
UNASOG UN Azouzou Strip Observer Group 
UNAVEM I UN Angola Verification Mission 
UNAVEM II UN Angola Verification Mission II 
UNAVEM III UN Angola Verification Mission III 
UNISFA UN Interim Security Force for Abyei Area 
UNITAF Unified Task Force (Operation Restore Hope) 
UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
UNMIL UN Mission in Liberia 
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UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan 
UNMISS UN Mission in South Sudan 
UNOMIL UN Observer Mission in Liberia 
UNOMSIL UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
UNOMUR UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda  
UNOSOM I  UN Operation in Somalia I 
UNOSOM II UN Operation in Somalia II 




Organization / Country 
Acronym 
Organization / Country Name 
ACOTA African Contingency Operations Training Assistance 
ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative 
APF African Peace Facility 
ASPA  African Peace and Security Architecture 
AU African Union 
CAR Central African Republic 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EU European Union 
LCB Lake Chad Basin 
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
MNJTF Multi-National Joint Task Force 
OAU Organization for African Unity 
REC  Regional Economic Community 
SWAPO South-West Africa Peoples’ Organization 
UN United Nations 
 
